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1. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the Florida Sexually Violent Predator (SVP)
Act' directed the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910-932 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255 (End) of
the 2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Sp. "A" Sess. of the 23d Leg.). The SVP Act is also
known as the Jimmy Ryce Act. The family of the victim of the crime that inspired
2
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"implement a long-term study to determine the overall efficacy of
the provisions of this part." The following is a first step toward a
comprehensive study. This Article is a policy analysis based
primarily on sexual recidivism data from samples of sex offenders
recommended for commitment but later released. The majority
were recommended but never committed. A subset consists of
formerly committed offenders. Recidivism data are essential for
evaluating the accuracy of commitment eligibility determinations
(risk assessment in particular), for comparing the efficacy of
inpatient versus outpatient treatment, for assessing the efficacy of
treatment (if any at all), and for estimating the number of possible
offenses prevented by a commitment policy. The last, in particular,
is important for evaluating cost effectiveness.
Recidivism data for a large sample of Florida sex offenders
recommended for commitment have not been published before
now. To the author's knowledge, no sample of SVP-relevant
offenders of this size (710 offenders) has ever been studied. These
are sex offenders determined to be commitment eligible by a team
of sex offender specialists in the mental health field. Given their
long release times (five to fourteen years for many), recidivism
rates for these offenders allow us to examine the accuracy of
contemporary risk assessment methods. This is crucial for studying
the accuracy of commitment eligibility determinations.
Some data were first gathered for a Florida Legislature Office
of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability
(OPPAGA) study conducted in late 2011, which examined
offenders recommended for commitment but granted a form
the Act has requested that references to the Act focus on its purpose.
2. Quarterly Reports, ch. 2014-19, sec. 109, § 394.931, 2014 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. (West) (removing the quoted language from the statute). Through 2013, the
study is mentioned in the last sentence of the Act, without elaboration. This
sentence does not appear in the 2014 revisions made to the SVP Act. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 394.931 (Westlaw). These revisions were made during this past legislative
session after the publication of a newspaper story criticizing the SVP program. See
Sally Kestin & Dana Williams, Sex Predators Unleashed, SUN SENTrNEL, Aug. 18, 2013,
available at LEXIS; discussion infra Part III.A; infra Appendix. The last two
sentences of section 394.931 of the current Act now read: "The Department of
Corrections shall compile recidivism data on those referred, detained, or
committed to the department. The data shall be included in the Department of
Corrections' annual report." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.931 (Westlaw). Apparently, DCF
is no longer required to conduct a long-term study of the efficacy of the provisions
of the Act.
[Vol. 41:3
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of conditional release by the courts (per stipulation or
settlement agreements). The 2011 data are contained in an
3unpublished memorandum. This OPPAGA study inspired a more
comprehensive study by the Florida Sexually Violent Predator
Program (SVPP) that was conducted in 2012." Additional relevant
data about offenders processed by SVPP are contained in the SVPP
database and are not published. These data sets will be discussed at
various points in this paper.' Florida sex crime data come from
Total Forcible Sex Offenses by Type and Rate for Florida, 1971-2013.6 For
purposes of comparison, sexual recidivism data from a 2012 Adam
Walsh study of Florida sex offenders (and offenders in three other
states), as well as sex crime and sexual recidivism data from other
states, are examined. Commitment-related census data and budget
3. Research Memorandum from the Fla. Legislature Office of Program
Policy Analysis and Gov't Accountability, Conditional Release of Sexually Violent
Predators Through Stipulated Agreements (Oct. 21, 2011) [hereinafter OPPAGA
Memo] (unpublished memorandum) (on file with author). Interested readers are
invited to send a written public records request for the memorandum to:
OPPAGA, 111 West Madison Street, Room 312, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1475.
4. Fla. Sexually Violent Predator Program, SVPP Recidivism Study Raw Data
(Aug. 31, 2014) [hereinafter SVPP Data] (unpublished data set through the study
completion date of February 28, 2013) (on file with the Florida Department of
Children and Families). Interested readers are invited to request a copy of the
SVPP Data by sending a public records request to: Sexually Violent Predator
Program, Department of Children and Families, Bldg. 6, 3rd floor, 1317
Winewood Blvd., Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700. The request may be made in the
form of a letter specifying that this is a public records request. For information on
Florida's Sunshine Law, see generally BRECHNER CTR. FOR FREEDOM OF INFO.,
FLORIDA GOVERNMENT 1N THE SUNSHINE: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE (1998).
5. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
6. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, FLORIDA STATEWIDE REPORTED SEX
OFFENSES 1971-2013 (2014) [hereinafter 1971-2013 REPORTED SEX OFFENSES]; see
also FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2013
(2014) [hereinafter 2013 FLA. CRIME REPORT]. Also utilized are data on declining
crime rates nationwide since the early 1990s. See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN
LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN No. NCJ 247648, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2013 (2014). For the percentage of all sexual assaults reported to
police in 2007, see MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN No.
NCJ 224390, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2007, at 6 (2008).
7. See, e.g., infra Part III.A. 1. Compare Hearing Before the Healthy Families H.
Subcomm., 2014 Legis. Sess., at 33:45 (Fla. 2014), availabe at http://www.my
floridahouse.gov/VideoPlayer.aspx?eventlD=2443575804_2014011023&committee
ID=2717 (presentation from the Florida Office of Economic and Demographic
Research), and KRISTEN M. ZGOBA ET AL., A MULTI-STATE RECIDIVISM STUDY USING
STATIC-99R AND STATIc-2002 RISK SCORES AND TIER GUIDELINES FROM THE ADAM
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data for the Florida SVPP are also utilized.' Finally, data on
lengthening the duration of criminal sentences 9 are relevant to
WALSH ACT 20-21 (2012) (presenting sexual recidivism rates and average Static-
99R scores for Florida and other states studied), with ROBERT BARNOSKI, WASH.
STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE:
RECIDVISM RATES (2005) (presenting sexual recidivism data in Washington), and
IVAN KUZYK, CONN. OFFICE OF POLICY AND MGMT., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY &
PLANNING DIv., RECIDIVISM AMONG SEX OFFENDERS IN CONNECTICUT 8-16 (2012)
(presenting sexual recidivism data in Connecticut), and CHERYL MILLOY, WASH.
STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, SIX-YEAR FOLLOW-UP OF 135 RELEASED SEX OFFENDERS
RECOMMENDED FOR COMMITMENT UNDER WASHINGTON'S SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR LAW, WHERE No PETITION WAS FILED 4-8 (2007) (presenting data on sex
offenders released in Washington), and MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., SEX OFFENDER
RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA 20-25 (2007), available at http://www.doc.state.mn
.us/pages/files/large-files/Publications/4-O7SexOffenderReport-Recidivism.pdf
(presenting sexual recidivism data for Minnesota), and Marcus T. Boccaccini et al.,
Field Validity of the Static-99 and MnSOST-R Among Sex Offenders Evaluated for Civil
Commitment as Sexually Violent Predators, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 278, 291
(2009) (presenting sexual recidivism data in Texas), and Denis L. Zavodny et al.,
Sexual-Recidivism Base Rates Relevant to SVP Assessments, GREG DECLUE (Aug.
4, 2012), http://gregdeclue.myakkatech.com/Sexual%20Recidivism%2ORates.pdf
(presenting sexual recidivism data for California and other states).
In January 2014, Florida had a civil confinement census of 647, and the
state's most recent census data indicate a population of 19,552,860. See THE PROF'L
STAFF OF THE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, THE FLA. SENATE, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL
IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 524, 2014 Reg. Sess., at 6 (2014) [hereinafter COMM. ON
APPROPRIATIONS], available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/0524
/Analyses/2014s0524.pre.ap.PDF (pre-meeting analysis document); State & County
Quick Facts: Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states
/12000.html (last revisedJul. 8, 2014) (presenting census data from 2013). To the
author's knowledge, the only state with a higher SVP civil commitment census is
California. This author has not found a specific figure for California. Its state
population census in 2013 was 38,332,521. See id.
The Adam Walsh Act (AWA) was inspired by the terrible sexual murder of a
child by that name. AWA was passed by Congress in 2006 and established stringent
registration requirements for sex offenders based on a standardized, offense-based
classification system (that was not based on Static or other actuarial categories). See
generally Lori McPherson, NDAA/APRI Nat'l Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse,
Practitioner's Guide to the Adam Walsh Act, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS (2007), http://ojp
.gov/smart/pdfs/practitioner-guide-awa.pdf.
8. See generally COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 7, at 6 (using the same
census figures); THE PROF'L STAFF OF THE COMM. ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND EDER
AFFAIRS, THE FLA. SENATE, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, FLA. S.160-
522, 2014 Reg. Sess., at 12 (2014) [hereinafter COMM. ON CHILDREN, FAMILY
AND ELDER AFFAIRS], available at http://static.lobbytools.com/bills/2014/pdf
/AS0522A1473.pdf (using confinement census data to discuss the financial
considerations of state sex offender programs).
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some observations about an emerging dilemma confronting
history-based risk assessment methodology.
This Article has four parts outside of this introduction:
background information and conceptual issues, 0 selection efficacy
assessing accuracy of eligibility determinations," policy efficacy,
and conclusions. Each part has several subsections.
Essential to a policy discussion of Florida's SVP program is a
sufficient conceptual background. Part II of this Article reviews the
statutory processes and competing value assessments involved in
identifying candidates for commitment, including balancing the
danger of overlooking certain sexual predators with the prospect of
over-confinement. 14 This contextual background is rounded out
with a critical discussion of the efficacy of current criteria used to
identify and commit sex offenders1 5 in light of emerging data.I6
This Article continues in Part III with a discussion of sex
offender candidate selection. Part III begins with an evaluation of
how well commitment-eligible sex offenders are being identified by
comparing sex offender recidivism rates in other states" and
considering the significance of a low recidivism rate in such an
evaluation. This is followed by an analysis of how well non-eligible
sex offenders are being identified.19 This analysis looks at empirical
data of recidivism rates and risk assessments to deduce how well
Florida's best practices function under the Florida SVPP in this
identification process. 2° In light of Florida's experience, Part III
concludes with recommendations for states like Minnesota that are
considering expanding their sex offender programs. Part IV
9. See generally PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, Low
RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS (2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org
/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/ pcs-assets/ 201 2/PewTimeServedreportpdf.pdf
(supplying data on average increases in the length of prison sentences from 1990
through 2012).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part II.A-B.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See infra Part II.D-E.
17. See infra Part III.A. 1.
18. See infra Part III.A.2.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part III.B. 1-11.
21. See infra Part III.B.12-13.
6
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explores policy considerations for such states considering a civil
commitment program.22 Following this author's conclusions is an
24
explanatory Appendix to aid in data comprehension.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
On January 1, 1999, the Involuntary Civil Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators Act (Act) went into effect in the State of
Florida. Part V of the Act falls under the Public Health (title
XXIX) and Mental Health (chapter 394) sections of the Florida
Statutes. The Act designates DCF as the state agency responsible for
establishing and maintaining SVPP. 26 Located in Tallahassee, SVPP
is responsible for making commitment-related recommendations to
state attorneys and for overseeing the operation of the Florida Civil
Commitment Center (FCCC) in Arcadia. 2' The SVPP receives and
processes all referrals of cases for commitment consideration
(mostly from the Department of Corrections), prepares files for
screening by soliciting additional information from law
enforcement agencies, conducts a first-level screening evaluation to
determine which individuals have a significant chance of meeting
criteria, and then arranges for psychologists in private practice on
contract with DCF to conduct face-to-face evaluations of selected
cases. Evaluation reports are reviewed by a multidisciplinary team
composed of six psychologists. 2s The multidisciplinary team makes
final determinations about which persons meet commitment
criteria. A letter is then sent to the relevant assistant state attorney
(ASA) with a recommendation to file, or not file, a petition for
commitment.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Appendix.
25. Act of May 26, 1999, ch. 99-222, 1999 Fla. Laws 1372.
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917, subdiv. 2 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255
(End) of the 2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Sp. "A" Sess. of the 23d Leg.).
27. DCF is responsible for oversight and contract monitoring for the FCCC,
which is operated by a private contractor. SVPP provides SVP- and sex offender-
specific training conferences to contract practitioners on a yearly basis.
28. The evaluator or evaluators for a particular case are considered members
of the team for that case. They do not attend multidisciplinary team meetings, as
their opinions and supporting arguments are already indicated in the evaluation
reports.
[Vol. 41:3
7
Montaldi: A Study of the Efficacy of the Sexually Violent Predator Act in F
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
2015] EFFICACY OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT 787
In Florida, a "sexually violent predator" is defined as someone
who "[h]as been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and
[siuffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not
confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and
treatment. ' '29 Previous conviction for sexual violence, mental
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912, subdiv. 10 (Westlaw). In this author's
experience, few mental health professionals, attorneys, or judges have any sense of
the significance of the word "makes" in the definition of a sexually violent
predator. In statutory language, mental abnormality makes likely the repetition of
sexually violent behavior. Although rarely understood, the phrase, "makes the
person likely" is essentially the legal meaning of mental abnormality rather than a
logically distinct element. The Supreme Court discusses this idea in Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1997) and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 407-08
(2002). See also In re Leon G., 59 P.3d 779, 786-87 (Ariz. 2002) (discussing the
statutory construction and meaning of the phrase "makes likely").
In order for a mental condition to have SVP legal relevance it must impair
capacity for behavioral control such that the person is unable to (consistently)
conform his behavior to the law, even if he wanted and tried to do so. Impairment
need not be absolute (it need not be as extreme as "irresistible impulse"), but it
must at least cause the person to have "serious difficulty" controlling his behavior.
This level of impairment allows sufficient control to avoid any particular offense
(e.g., if police are nearby), but not enough to bring an end to one's sexual
criminal pattern. Someone unable to end such a pattern (unable to consistently
respond to deterrence-related incentives) is someone who is necessarily dangerous
("made likely" to continue violent behavior). Mental abnormality is a mental
condition causing this kind of difficulty. It is thus more than a condition that
generates urges to engage in crime (i.e., the intense, recurrent fantasies or urges
noted in diagnostic criteria for clinically defined paraphilia or sexual deviance
disorder). All violent criminals, especially violent recidivists (whom the United
States Supreme Court calls "dangerous but typical recidivist[s]") have ongoing
motivation to commit crimes. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413. This does not make them
inappropriate for (exclusive) management by means of a deterrence-based system
(the criminal justice system) designed to protect the public from crime.
Involuntary hospitalization is only for those who are impaired with respect to
resisting such impulses in order to remain lawful. This is why clinical diagnoses are
not by themselves sufficient to constitute mental abnormality. In this author's
experience, mental health professionals rarely, if ever, understand this point. See
Daniel F. Montaldi, A Philosophy of SVP: One Approach to Identifying Sexually Violent
Predators, in CIVIC RESEARCH INST., THE SEXUAL PREDATOR, LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE,
ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT CONCERNs 4-7 to -11 (Anita Schlank, ed., 2014)
[hereinafter Montaldi, Philosophy of SVP] (describing how relationships between
SVP and clinical concepts are treated extensively); see also Daniel F. Montaldi, The
Logic of Sexually Violent Predator Status in the United States of America, SEXUAL
-OFFENDER-TREATMENT.ORG (2007), http://www.sexual-offender-treatmetit.org/57
.html.
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abnormality or personality disorder, and the "likely" element are
the three criteria for commitment. In the legislative findings and
intent section of the statute, lawmakers describe the population
these criteria are intended to address. In that section, the
legislature finds that there is a "small but extremely dangerous
number" of predatory sex offenders for whom the likelihood of
"repeat acts" of sexual violence is "high. ,3 0 These individuals have
"antisocial features" that render them not appropriate for short-
term treatment.' In the next section, lawmakers state that sexual
predators are not appropriate for Baker Act, or non-SVP,
commitment.3' Less restrictive alternatives to full confinement are
"not applicable" to sexually violent predators.)
An offender is generally determined to meet the first criterion
(conviction for sexual violence) by the referring agency (most
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (Westlaw).
31. Id. (Westlaw). Non-SVP commitment options are addressed in id. ch. 394,
pt. I (Westlaw).
32. Id. § 394.910 (Westlaw).
33. The description of the population that lawmakers regard as sexually
violent predators, found in the findings and intent section of the statute, is
generally ignored by mental health professionals and other parties in the
commitment process. Id. (Westlaw). A common view, expressed to this author on
more than one occasion, is that this section is no more than an "introduction" to
the law. This perspective-a kind of statutory literalism-directs evaluators to just
attend to commitment criteria (i.e., the statutory definition of a sexually violent
person found in the definitions section of the statute). Id. § 394.912 (Westlaw).
Does the offender being evaluated meet these criteria? It is assumed that the
empirical/statistical methods and clinical concepts of the mental health
profession can answer this question directly, without further legal context. It is at
least arguable that statutory literalism reflects a serious misunderstanding of legal
language and its purpose. Evaluators are not only ignoring the central idea
supporting mental abnormality ("serious difficulty") -they are also ignoring the
descriptive facts lawmakers give in the findings that justify commitment. The SVP
prototype being described is clearly not just any sex offender who qualifies for a
clinical paraphilia diagnosis and a high actuarial score. The former can be
minimally based on as few as two sex offenses if the evaluator treats diagnostic
criteria as cookbook rules or sufficient conditions (which is not uncommon
practice). A high actuarial score can be earned with some additional non-sexual
violent criminal history, absence of long-term relationships, one unrelated victim,
and young age. Many general criminals will meet these conditions, exactly the
"typical recidivist" deemed by the Supreme Court as not appropriate for
hospitalization-based forms of crime control. The ramifications of neglecting
legislative descriptions (and key legal concepts) for rendering sexual violent
predator determinations insufficiently selective will be clear from the research
discussed in this Article.
[Vol. 41:3
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referrals come from the Department of Corrections). The
multidisciplinary team makes final determinations about which
offenders meet the second criterion (mental abnormality or
personality disorder), and the third criterion (likely to engage in
sexual violence if not confined). Given the purpose of the law, the
third criterion receives the most emphasis, making risk assessment
the primary element of a commitment evaluation. Evaluating theS . 34
efficacy of risk assessments is the primary focus of this discussion.
SVPP is not involved in commitment-related decision making
after the recommendation phase, such as whether a case is taken to
trial or whether a settlement agreement is reached. ASAs and the
courts make these decisions. Petitions may not be filed without an
affirmative recommendation by SVPP.' 5 SVPP is not involved in
annual reviews of committed persons or release decisions. ASAs
and defense attorneys contract directly with psychologists in private
practice to conduct annual review evaluations.
34. Mental abnormality is defined by Florida statute. Id. § 394.912, subdiv. 5
(Westlaw). Personality disorder is not defined as it is in at least some other states.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § I (West, Westlaw through ch. 379 of the
2014 2d Ann. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020, subdiv. 9 (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Legis.). Technically, it is "mental abnormality or personality
disorder" that makes someone likely to continue sexual violence. So it is possible
for a sexually violent predator to lack mental abnormality. However, it is rare in
Florida for experts to determine that someone meets criteria with only a
personality disorder diagnosis (coupled with high actuarial risk). This is because
most offenders deemed to meet criteria receive a clinical diagnosis of antisocial
personality disorder, which, given its very broad behavioristic criteria, will apply to
most anyone with an extensive criminal history (especially typical recidivists).
Lawmakers refer to "antisocial features," but mostly to distinguish this population
from persons subject to the Baker Act (non-SVP commitment) where criteria
exclude antisocial personality. Mental abnormality is the key construct in the
second criterion. It is common for mental health professionals to see a clinical
paraphilia (now "paraphilic disorder") diagnosis as enough to constitute mental
abnormality. Hereafter, "mental abnormality" alone is used when referring to the
second criterion.
35. In the early years, some of the commitment recommendations did not
elicit petitions and some petitions were filed without commitment
recommendations. But since these years, ASAs must have an affirmative
commitment recommendation to file a petition.
36. Many of these psychologists are also on contract with DCF/SVPP for
initial commitment evaluations. DCF/SVPP is not involved in the other contracted
activities of these practitioners.
10
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A. Studying the Efficacy of a Sex Offender Commitment Law
The Act does not provide details about what is meant by
"efficacy" or explain how the provisions of the Act are to be
examined. What questions did lawmakers want answered by such a
study? Beyond legislative intent, there are larger issues of how a sex
offender commitment law should be evaluated in order to be
maximally informative to principled policymakers in a free society.
Efficacy can have different meanings in the context of sex
offender civil commitment laws. One obvious meaning is the
effectiveness of SVP commitment in protecting the public from the
sexual crimes that committed persons would have otherwise
perpetrated. Of course, a study would not be necessary simply to
confirm that persons kept away from society do not commit crimes
in society.37 A serious policy analysis would examine whether
commitment has had a measurable impact on statewide sexual
crime rates. It would also consider how effectively commitment-
eligible persons are being identified and committed, as well as how
securely they are being controlled once rendered subject to
commitment proceedings. Finally, the policy analyst would
examine how well mandated services (e.g., treatment) are being
provided to committed persons. Given the main purpose of the
Act, lawmakers would be most concerned with impact on crime
rates.
It is reasonable to think that lawmakers did not think any
significant number of offenders fitting the description of "a small
but extremely dangerous number"" would ever be released once
committed, or that any significant number would not be taken to
trial and committed if they had been recommended for
commitment. So lawmakers would probably not have intended the
DCF to study recidivism rates for formerly committed sex offenders
or offenders recommended for commitment but not committed
(the primary focus of the SVPP recidivism study).
However, recidivism data for these offenders are crucial for
assessing the accuracy of the risk assessments and commitment
determinations that have supported multidisciplinary team
recommendations. Among the provisions of the Act to be studied
are ones that task mental health professionals with making
37. SVPP data provide some basis for estimating how many crimes this might
be.
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (Westlaw).
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commitment recommendations based on psychological evaluations,
which include risk assessments. Recidivism data from offenders
considered for commitment but later released constitute the only
way a policy analyst can tell how well commitment-eligible persons
are being identified and recommended. Offenders recommended
for commitment were recommended because they were
determined to meet the "likely" criterion. Only by studying those
who ended up not committed (hence released) can the analyst
know whether they were in fact likely to reoffend at the time of
evaluation. Assuming a statistically descriptive interpretation of
"likely" (i.e., likely to become a new reoffender), a group of
offenders likely to reoffend would be expected to eventually
generate a sexual recidivism rate of over 50% (i.e., over 50% of the
offenders in the group became reoffenders) if they are released
and followed over a long period of time. A group of offenders
determined to be "not likely" would be expected to generate a rate
below 50%; hopefully, the rate will be well below. In the case of
offenders recommended for commitment but released without
commitment, did the percentage of reoffenders approach or
exceed 50%? For offenders not recommended, was their
reoffender percentage below 50%?
Risk assessment accuracy is thus not just a matter of identifying
predators or persons who meet commitment criteria. It is also a
matter of identifying non-predators or persons who do not meet
criteria. Universal commitment for all sex offenders at end-of-
sentence would eliminate any chance of a missed predator. It
would also remove the need for evaluation and risk assessment, as
well as the need for the second and third criteria for commitment.39
The fact that evaluations are required means that lawmakers
intended the recommendation process to be selective. So, some
risk of missing predators is already inherent to the process. The fact
that there are more criteria than just previous conviction for a
sexual offense means that not every documented sex offender is
eligible. Unless one assumes that no non-eligible sex offenders
reoffend after release, the fact that sexual recidivism will continue
to occur even with commitment is also inherent to the process. The
fact that there are commitment criteria at all entails that someone
may be committed if, but only if he or she meets criteria. The
39. The first criterion simply requires that a person be a documented sex
offender.
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policy analyst must therefore look at both the criteria-related
sensitivity and specificity of the eligibility determination process
(i.e., how well criteria-determined eligible and ineligible persons
are being identified).
B. Competing Values: Not Missing Predators Versus Avoiding
Unnecessary Confinements
Understandably, lawmakers would have cared mostly about
accurate identification of all persons who meet criteria for
commitment, so that every sex offender who needs further
confinement is committed. The primary goal would be no missed
predators. Lawmakers would have cared less about how successful
SVPP experts were in avoiding unnecessary commitments or
misidentifying non-eligible persons as predators (commitment-
eligible persons).
The risk of missed predators and the risk of ineligible persons
being civilly confined cannot be simultaneously minimized. The
very existence of an SVP law gives social value priority to the public
safety benefits of confining predators. This means the acceptance
of some risk of unnecessary commitments or persons unnecessarily
deprived of physical liberty without being charged with a new
crime. On the other hand, if avoiding unnecessary liberty loss were
considered to be the priority value, then it would not be possible to
have a process that commits anyone, given some chance of
erroneous commitments. Minimizing the chance of unnecessary
civil confinements means some risk of predators being released and
creating victims who would not otherwise have been victimized by a
predator (i.e., victimized by someone who would meet
commitment criteria if a commitment process existed). The risk of
being victimized by offenders who would not meet criteria even if
40commitment existed would remain the same either way.
Presumably, if both values were considered to be exactly equal in
importance, the decision could go either way, perhaps settled by
some random process.
The comparative importance of not missing predators versus
avoiding unnecessary commitments is not the same for the actual
operation of a commitment recommendation process, once it is
established. Experts responsible for the process of determining
40. A later section will address the issue of offenders who will reoffend but
do not meet commitment criteria prior to re-offense. See infra Part lID.
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commitment eligibility must treat both as extremely important.
Identifying those persons who meet the criteria fulfills the purpose
of the law. Identifying persons who do not meet the criteria
facilitates due process in compliance with the law. Legally, it would
make no sense to require the state to prove that someone is
dangerous if the expert whose opinion is part of this proof did not
bear a similar (clinical) burden of proof in supporting the opinion
that someone is dangerous.4'
Additionally, professional ethics require evaluators to use
methods appropriate to the task. This implies methods that are asS 42
accurate as possible. If experts use methods they know to have
poor accuracy (sensitivity or specificity), then they cannot be
sincere in indicating reasonable certainty in opinions based on
application of those methods. This is not to say that experts may
never err on the side of an affirmative opinion in a close call case.
It is to say that they may not err as standard practice, or deliberately
utilize wide-net methods for the sake of never missing a predator.
Ethically, the first duty of the mental health professional is to do no
harm. Expressing shaky opinions in support of commitment, or
utilizing methods once it becomes known that they produce many
false positives (i.e., ineligible persons misidentified as eligible),
constitutes a willingness to tolerate more than the rare unnecessary
commitment. This is doing harm to the people receiving clinical
services (evaluation) for the sake of what is anticipated to be
somebody else's wellbeing.
41. To this point this author has heard the response, "The process protects
the rights of persons subject to the Act because there is due process and they have
defense attorneys." The idea is that the state's methods can be loose, even grossly
inaccurate with regard to specificity, as long as the defense has an opportunity to
challenge them in court. This response is sometimes paired with the claim that
SVPP should continue using flawed methodology until the legislature gives
"permission" to use a more accurate method. Readers can speculate about the
likelihood of such permission and judge for themselves the relevant ethics. On the
issue of rights protection, a growing body of research is showing the extended due
process protections are undermined by using juries as fact-finders in commitment
cases. Jurors are prone to commit an offender, before hearing any supporting
evidence that he or she meets criteria, simply on the basis of the fact he or she is
the subject of commitment proceedings. See Nicholas Scurich & Daniel A. Krauss,
The Presumption of Dangerousness in Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Proceedings,
13 L. PROBABILTY & RISK 91, 99 (2014).
42. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND
CODE OF CONDUCT § 9 (2010).
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No legislature has stated a finding that public safety justifies
toleration of unnecessary commitments. No high court has ever
considered and upheld a commitment law where it was presented
with evidence that the evaluation methods the state was using were
likely to generate more false positives than true positives (i.e., more
ineligible persons misidentified as eligible than eligible persons
accurately identified). Giving high importance to specificity is not
allowing the rights of sex offenders to trump community
protection. Instead, it is simply ensuring that commitment
recommendations are restricted to just those persons from whom
43the community needs protection.
The attitude of "better too many [committed] than too few" is
difficult to avoid when thinking about terrible crimes and people
who, at least during the years of their offending, were frightful
criminals.44 But this attitude turns Blackstone's famous ratio on its
43. Some would argue that sexual recidivism base rates are so low that
(assuming base rates indicate probabilities) the empirically grounded evaluator
cannot have reasonable certainty that any offender is associated with a recidivism
probability high enough to meet any quantitative interpretation of the "likely"
standard. See, e.g., Scott I. Vrieze & William M. Grove, Predicting Sex Offender
Recidivism: I. Correcting for Item Overselection and Accuracy Overestimation in Scale
Development. II. Sampling-Induced Attenuation of Predictive Validity Over Base-Rate
Information., 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 266, 275 (2007). It is certainly possible for
principled practitioners to adopt this position. It is also possible to take the
position that professional ethics preclude the participation of mental health
professionals in any process that generates commitment affirmative opinions.
However, for practitioners choosing to participate in a commitment
recommendation process, it is not possible to adopt these positions and also fulfill
their mandate. Their stance would have to be that ethical requirements are met if
affirmative opinions are not made without compelling support, precluding any
wide-net approach.
This author has heard the claim from state officials that perhaps mental
health professionals should not administer SVP programs, given their "ethics."
Left unexplained was how a non-psychologist administrator would produce more
commitment recommendations from psychologist employees if the latter
continued to act on their ethics.
44. In his study of revolutionary Russia, Orlando Figes describes an extreme
form of preventive thinking in the Soviet Union of the late 1930s:
Stalin was prepared to arrest thousands of innocent people to catch
just one spy. As he calculated, if only 5 per cent of those arrested
turned out to be truly enemies, "that would be a good result."
According to Khrushchev, who was then the Moscow Party boss, Stalin
"used to say that if a report [denunciation] was ten per cent true, we
should regard the entire report as fact." Everybody in the NKVD knew
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head, a particularly problematic perspective for a free society acting
to prevent crimes only anticipated.45
C. Different Approaches to Assessing Accuracy of Risk Assessments
How is it possible to analyze the accuracy of SVP-related risk
assessments? There are two approaches. The first one is better than
the second one. The first approach examines sexual recidivism
rates for offenders deemed "likely" to reoffend and offenders
deemed "not likely," to see if the former rate is high enough
(greater than 50%) and the latter rate low enough (below 50%).
In contrast, the second approach simply treats every sexual
recidivist in the group of offenders deemed "not likely" to be a
predator who was erroneously not recommended for commitment
ahead of time. Similarly, every non-recidivist in the "likely" group is
a non-predator who was mistaken for a predator. The first
approach is superior because likelihood (risk) determinations are
that holding back from their quota of arrests would get them into
trouble for lack of vigilance. "Better too far than not far enough," Yezhov
warned his operatives. If "an extra thousand people will be shot, that is
not such a big deal."
See ORLANDO FIGES, REVOLUTIONARY RussiA 1891-1991: A HISTORY 194 (2014)
(emphasis added).
The point is not that a well-managed commitment process striving to identify
dangerous offenders, and not misidentify other offenders, is necessarily on a
slippery slope toward totalitarianism. Whether or not SVP laws are ultimately
justifiable, it is only fair to note that sex offender civil commitment facilities are
vastly more humane than Soviet facilities holding political prisoners in the 1930s,
and unlike political prisoners, committed persons can potentially benefit from the
treatment opportunities being offered. In theory (and in some states, occasionally
in practice), a committed resident can advance in treatment to the point where he
can eventually obtain full discharge. It is also true that, at least in years past, sex
offenders now being committed were dangerous, and did heinous acts at one time,
even if many are no longer dangerous after their last long sentence is completed.
The same cannot be said of most victims of political terror and oppression. The
point is only that a similar kind of thinking can be involved in both contexts, albeit
much different in degree, to the detriment of other values.
45. Blackstone's ratio from English common law (the basis of American
jurisprudence) expresses a hierarchy of values, captured in the saying: "Better ten
guilty persons escape than one innocent man suffer." See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *358. The point of this ratio is not to give a quantitative measure of
value (or an exchange rate), but to provide a dramatic illustration of fundamental
values in the criminal law of a rights-based society. This order of values
exemplified in the ratio grounds a host of procedural rules and legal protections
for defendants in criminal cases.
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not predictions of eventual outcomes. These are subtle points, so it
is helpful to look at each approach in more detail.
The first approach divides released offenders into two groups.
One group consists of offenders who were determined to meet the
"likely" criterion for commitment. In Florida, a sexually violent
predator is someone who is likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined (or more precisely, a documented sex
offender with a mental condition that makes the person likely to
continue sexual offending if not placed in a secure facility for long-
term control, care, and treatment). Offenders determined by
experts using risk assessment methods to be likely to have a new
sexual offense if not committed (but who were released by the
courts without commitment) would constitute the "likely" group. A
second group would be composed of offenders who were
determined to not meet the "likely" standard. This is the "not
likely" group. These offenders are the type that would be released
at end-of-sentence because they would not be recommended for
commitment. Given the intent of lawmakers to commit a "small but
extremely dangerous number, 46 of sexual predators, the "not likely"
group will vastly outnumber the "likely" group.
Throughout the years of SVP commitment in Florida, SVPP
and its evaluators commonly interpreted "likely" to mean "more
likely than not" and gave it a quantitative interpretation (i.e.,
likelihood greater than 50%). It was also common practice in
Florida to interpret the sexual recidivism rates on the actuarial
tables for risk assessment instruments such as the Static-99 47 as
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255 (End) of the
2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Spec. "A" Sess. of the 23d Leg.).
47. An actuarial risk assessment instrument is a list of generally unchanging
(static) characteristics of sex offenders statistically associated with sexual recidivism
according to recidivism studies. The characteristics are mostly facts about sexual
and other criminal history, victim type, sentencing occasions, and so forth, as well
as some limited details about social history (e.g., any history of lasting intimate
relationships) and some demographic information (e.g., age). Offenders are
scored according to how many of these characteristics they possess. An actuarial
table consists of sexual recidivism rates observed (or predicted) for samples of
offenders with a given score or scoring in a given range. Each score or score range
is associated with one sample considered to be "normative." There is one rate for
each sample. See ANDREW HARRIS ET AL., STATIC-99 CODING RuLEs REVISED 2003 app.
6, at 69 (2003); see also AMY PHENIX ET AL., STATIC-99R & STATIC-2002R:
EVALUATORS' WORKBOOK 5-8 (2012). Actuarial tables are contained in these
manuals.
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probabilities (or likelihoods) of offenders committing a new sexual
offense after their most recent release. The high-risk sample for
the Static-99 consisted of 129 offenders (with scores of 6 or more).
The sex offense reconviction rate associated with this sample is
listed as 0.52. This means that an estimated 67 offenders would
have been reconvicted within fifteen years of release had they all
been released at the same time and followed for fifteen years (0.52
x 129 = 67). 49 Fifteen years is the longest follow-up period for the
Static-99. Interpreting this rate as a probability yields a 0.52
probability of reconviction for new sexual offenses, or 52%
likelihood. This likelihood is higher than 50%, so it was common to
consider offenders falling into this category as meeting the "likely"
standard.
This interpretation is assumed for purposes of the present
discussion. How might one assess the accuracy of risk assessments
that placed offenders into the "likely" group? It is first important to
look at a group of such offenders who were released instead of
committed and see if the sex offense reconviction rate was in fact
higher than 50%. No offender recommended for commitment in
Florida would be qualified for release for fifteen years by the end of
the SVPP study in February 2013. The ten-year rate for the high-risk
sample on the Static-99 is 45%. The five-year rate is 39%. The
average release time of offenders in the SVPP study has yet to be
calculated but is likely to be six to seven years (many have been
48. This author treats probabilities as decimal values when quantified
(e.g., 0.52). Likelihoods will be treated as percentages (e.g., 52%).
Likelihood = probability x 100%. For purposes of this discussion, the terms will be
treated as interchangeable in basic meaning: both indicate degree of possibility.
49. Technically, rates for the Static-99 come from what is called survival
analysis, which is used when the offenders in a sample were not all released at the
same time. R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessments for Sex
Offenders: A Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 125
(2000). The sample of 129 offenders did not consist of 129 offenders released at
the same time and followed, as a group, for another fifteen years. Id. at 128. Their
release times varied, which means different periods of time spent in the
community with the opportunity to reoffend. Id. at 125. The 67 figure does not,
therefore, necessarily reflect the exact number of reconvicted offenders found in
this sample. In a sense, we might say that the 67 figure reflects the number of
reconvicted offenders we would expect to find in a group of offenders with a 0.52
probability (52% likelihood) of reconviction, based on actual observation of a
group of offenders with scores in the "high" range (6 or more), at least some of
whom survived in the community for fifteen years (without a new sex offense
conviction).
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released ten or more years). It is reasonable to use the five-year rate
for comparison. A group of offenders in the "likely" category would
be expected to have at least a 39% sexual reconviction rate within
five years of release. If the group in fact displays this rate, or a
higher rate, then the risk assessments placing offenders into this
group were accurate. This does not mean every single assessment
was accurate, but the aggregate result would indicate a reasonable
degree of accuracy in determining which offenders meet the
"likely" standard.
What does this mean for assessing the accuracy of those risk
assessments that placed offenders into the "not likely" group?
These are offenders that, collectively, are supposed to have a
likelihood quantity lower than 50% (orjust at 50%). The next step
is to look at a group of "not likely" offenders who were released to
see if their reconviction rate is indeed below 50% (or below 39%
for five years release time). Preferably, this rate would be as far
below 50% as possible.
It is not reasonable to expect the rate to be zero. Tens of
thousands of sex offenders will not meet the "likely" standard. The
majority of sex offenders approaching end-of-sentence (when they
are referred for commitment consideration in Florida) have only
one known sex offense in their histories (87% of the 3000 or so
offenders referred for commitment consideration in fiscal year
2012-13).50 In Florida, this would not be enough documented
sexual criminal history to support a paraphilia diagnosis and a high
actuarial score. So, they are released at end-of-sentence. For any
group of released sex offenders not physically incapacitated
immediately upon release, there will be offenders who offend
again. If the number of released offenders is in the tens of
thousands, even a small percentage reoffending will mean
hundreds of reoffenders who did not meet commitment criteria
ahead of time. Some reoffenders may well be offenders who did
meet criteria ahead of time based on what their mental condition
really was, and for some there may have been sufficient
documented sexual criminal history in the file for evaluators to
potentially make this determination with reasonable confidence.
But the majority of reoffenders will not fall into this category.
Society would prefer that the recidivist percentage for the "not
likely" group be as low as is realistic to expect.
50. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
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The second approach to assessing the accuracy of SVP-related
risk assessments is to look at the group of offenders who were
determined not to meet commitment criteria, the "not likely"
group, and see how many offenders had a new sex offense. The
reoffenders are then considered to be missed predators or
offenders who did meet commitment criteria but were not
accurately identified as such. Given that no process is perfect and
consistently accurate prediction in individual cases is not possible,
if the number of reoffenders is a small percentage of the group,
then this is the best we can expect. As it turns out, this percentage
is 2%-4% in Florida (to be discussed later in this Article).
However, this approach assumes that an eligible offender
wrongly determined to be non-eligible is anyone who later
reoffends. This ignores the fact that the vast majority of sex
offenders referred for commitment consideration do not meet the
second and third criteria at time of commitment consideration
because there is not enough documented sexual criminal history to
support a paraphilia diagnosis and a high actuarial score. So they
are released at end-of-sentence. And, as noted, in any group of
released sex offenders not physically incapacitated immediately
upon release, there will be offenders who offend again. The
number of missed predators is therefore a minority fraction of the
2%-4%.
This raises an issue that is difficult for the non-expert (and
probably many experts) to grasp. It is counterintuitive. It is the fact
that most sex offenders who will sexually reoffend after release
would not have met commitment criteria prior to release.
D. Most Sex Offenders Who Reoffend Do Not Meet Commitment Criteria
Prior to Reoffending
Many do not meet commitment criteria, even after reoffending. Non-
experts seldom understand this point because it is counterintuitive.
For many years it has been standard practice in Florida (and likely
nationwide) to require a "high" range (or at least "high moderate")
actuarial score to conclude that an offender meets the "likely"
criterion for commitment. Exceptions exist, but they are
exceptions, not the rule. Based on this, actuarial tables for risk
assessment instruments provide data that make clear the fact that
most offenders who will obtain new sex offense charges or
convictions after release will not earn "high" or even "high
20
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moderate" scores based on their known criminal history prior to
release.
The actuarial table for the Static-99 provides a useful example.
It was the risk assessment instrument used in Florida (evaluators
could use additional instruments if desired). Listed reconviction
rates on the Static-99 come from a sample of offenders released
during an era (1950s to early 1980s) in which recidivism rates were
higher than those found in recent years." ' As noted, experts
commonly consider offenders falling in the "high risk" category on
the Static-99 (scores of 6 or higher with the highest possible score
being 12) as meeting the "likely" criterion for commitment. This is
because only this category on the original instrument is associated
with a reconviction rate exceeding 50%.
From a total sample size of 1086 offenders used to norm the
instrument, 129 offenders fell into the "high risk" normative
sample (or subsample). Given that the five-year rate listed was 0.52,
this means that we can expect there would have been sixty-seven
reconvicted offenders (0.52 x 129) had the entire sample been
51. The fact that rates were higher in past decades can be seen by comparing
rates listed on the actuarial table for the original Static-99 to the rates on tables for
the Static-99R. The former are higher. For example, the ten-year rate for offenders
with scores of 6 or more for the Static-99 is 45%. The ten-year rate for offenders
with a score of 6 in the non-routine sample is 33.4%. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note
47, app. 6, at 69; see also PHENIX ET AL., supra note 47, at 5-8. The most dramatic
evidence, however, is found in the data from the OPPAGA and SVPP studies, soon
to be discussed infra Part III.B. Rates for offenders in these studies, most of whom
scored at least a 5 on the Static, are much lower than rates listed for both the
Static-99 and the 99R. For example, the OPPAGA study found a 3.6% sex offense
reconviction rate for 140 offenders recommended for commitment but granted a
form of conditional release pursuant to settlement agreements. Offenders with
settlement agreements (at the time of this study) had an average Static-99 score of
5.91 (average release time at least five years). This means that most offenders had
scores of at least 6. On the Static-99, the five-year reconviction rate for a sample of
offenders with scores of 6 or more is 39%. Further evidence of higher rates in past
decades is the overall decline in sexual and violent offense rates since the early
1990s. For example, since 1993 the rate of violent crime (a category that includes
sexual crime) has declined 72%, from 79.8 to 23.2 victimizations per 1000 people
age twelve or older. See TRUMAN & LANGTON, supra note 6, at 1.
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released at the same time and followed for fifteen years.52 Because
the sample is small, this number comprises a relatively high
percentage of the total membership of the high-risk subgroup. For
years it was standard practice for experts to interpret rates as
probabilities (or more precisely, proportions were treated as
probabilities, and percentages were treated as likelihoods). A
reconvicted offender percentage of 52% tips above 50%. Treating
the percentage as likelihood, this means that offenders in the high-
risk category for the Static-99 would have a 52% likelihood of
becoming reconvicted offenders. This likelihood would be treated
as sufficient for "more likely than not" and thus high enough to
reach the "likely" threshold.
In contrast, a total of 957 offenders fell into the lower score
subgroups. This is a much larger comparison group. In contrast to
the high-risk sample, where only 67 reoffenders were enough to
produce a greater than 50% likelihood, there would have to be 500
or more reoffenders for a similar likelihood to be generated for the
group of 957 offenders. As it is, a total of 205 offenders in this
group (scores 0-5) are expected to be reconvicted for post-release
sexual offenses. This is obviously a larger number of reconvicted
offenders than the number of reconvicted offenders in the high-
risk sample. But it comprises a much smaller percentage of the
52. The number of reconvicted offenders in other subsamples (lower scores)
can be calculated in the same way. The number comes from multiplying the rate
listed on the experience table for a particular sample of offenders by the total
number in the sample. The below calculations are based on the Static-99 table:
Offenders Reconviction Reconvicted
Sample Size Score Rate Offenders
89 0 0.16 14
150 1 0.07 11
204 2 0.16 33
206 3 0.19 39
190 4 0.36 68
100 5 0.4 40
129 6 or higher 0.52 67
("High Risk" Classification)
1068 TOTALS 272
See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 47, app. 6, at 69.
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relevant group (205 / 957 = 0.214 (21.4%)), and a likelihood well
below 50%.
This means that out of a grand total of 272 reconvicted
offenders in a sample of 1086 offenders, 205 would not be
associated with a likelihood of conviction high enough to meet the
"likely" standard (when interpreted quantitatively)." The 205
reoffenders in the lower score group comprise 75% of the
reconvicted offenders in the sample. For the whole sample, 25%
(272) were reconvicted for a new sex offense within fifteen years of
release. If the same percentage characterized a sample of 31,626
offenders considered for commitment in Florida since 1999, there
would be 7921 reconvicted offenders in the sample. Only 1949 of
the 7921 (25%) would meet the "likely" standard prior to
reconviction. Fortunately, sexual recidivism has decreased
substantially since the development of the original Static. As it is,
less than a third of this number (562 reconvicted offenders) had
not received commitment recommendations ahead of time in
Florida.
Data on statewide-reported sexual crimes and referrals for
commitment consideration support the same point about most
reoffenders not having been commitment-eligible ahead of time. In
fact, most sexual offenses of any kind (whether first-time offenses
or instances of recidivism) likely come from persons who do not
meet commitment criteria prior to committing those crimes. This is
in part because most sexual offenses probably come from persons
not yet known to authorities to be sex offenders (i.e., they have yet
to have a first arrest or conviction). Given the first criterion for
commitment (previous conviction for a sexual offense), none of
these individuals would be referred for commitment consideration
or could meet criteria even if referred.
The following should be considered: in fiscal year 2012-13,
approximately 3000 sex offenders approaching end-of-sentence in
53. Even if offenders with "high-moderate" scores (4-5) are included within
the "likely" group, the number of reconvicted offenders not meeting this criterion
is still substantial (97). Specifically, a total of 68 reconvicted offenders were in the
subgroup comprised of offenders with a score of 4 (36% of 190 offenders) and 40
reconvicted offenders were in the subgroup with a score of 5 (40% of 100
offenders). When these reoffenders (108) are added to the reoffenders in the
high-score subgroup (67), this constitutes 175 reconvicted offenders, which leaves
97 reconvicted offenders (in the score range of 0-3) who would not meet
threshold. Rates for scores of 0-3 are far below 50%.
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Florida were referred for commitment consideration. Of these,
87% were offenders with just one prior sex-related conviction. An
additional 11% consisted of offenders with two convictions.5' For
the most part (but not always) these 98% are the offenders who
earn less-than-high scores on the Static (99/99R). Most do not
meet clinical criteria for a paraphilia diagnosis, which requires at
least two known offenses. Only 2% of offenders had two or more
sex-related convictions, which, for Florida SVPP, is generally
(although not always) needed for a well-supported paraphilia
diagnosis (to meet the mental abnormality criterion) and a high
actuarial score (to meet the "likely" criterion).
If all 60 persons (2% of offenders with two or more sex-related
convictions) were recommended, this leaves 2940 offenders not
recommended. According to the Adam Walsh study, 5.2% of all sex
offenders released from prison will have a new sex-related charge
within five years. This rate comes from a group of offenders with an
average Static-99R score of 2, which would not generally be
sufficient to meet the "likely" criterion. Using the number of
offenders referred for commitment for one year, the number
referred for consideration for a five-year period would be
approximately 15,000. 5 Approximately 14,700 offenders would not
be recommended for commitment (5 x 2940). Using the 5.2% rate,
764 of these offenders would be expected to have at least a new sex-
related charge (not all within the same five-year period, but on
average, over time). Over a five-year period, approximately 300
offenders would be referred for commitment, with at least three
convictions. Assuming all would be recommended and assuming all
would have reoffended if released, the number of reoffenders not
eligible for commitment is over twice the number of offenders who
were eligible.
Considering sex offending in general, there are reasons to
think that the amount of new sexual offenses coming from already
documented sex offenders is a small fraction of all sexual offenses
leading to arrest (even less of all that is reported or all that occurs,
54. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
55. Even if all offenders with at least two convictions are committed (13%, or
approximately 390 out of 3000 offenders for one year), this would do nothing to
prevent the sexual recidivism coming from the remaining 2610 offenders (87%),
about 5% of whom (130 offenders) would be expected to reoffend. SVPP Data,
supra note 4.
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reported or not)." A study of sex offenses in New York looked at all
sex offenses resulting in arrest for the period of 1986 to 2006. 57
There were over 170,000 sexual offense arrests for 160,000 unique
sex offenders. 58 Approximately 96% of all arrests for rapes and 94%
of all arrests for child molestation involved first-time sex
offenders, that is, offenders arrested for the first time, having no
previous arrests or convictions for sexual offenses. Absent prior
conviction, these offenders would not have been on the sex
offender registry for New York. Had they been Florida sex
offenders, these individuals would not have been referred for
commitment consideration, given that they would not have met the
first criterion (at least one conviction for a sexually violent
offense). This means that at least 94%-96% of sexual crimes could
not have been prevented by commitment, and the percentage is
even higher given that only a small fraction of all sex offenders
referred for commitment consideration end up committed.
Florida data make the same point. For example, in 2013, the
year in which the total number of reported sex offenses in Florida
was at a historic low, 9863 sexual crimes were reported. Over a
five-year period, assuming stable rates, there would be a total of
49,315 reported sex offenses. If all of this offending were coming
from the 764 reoffenders not eligible for commitment this would
be at least 65 new offenses from every one of them, which is highly
unlikely. It is much more likely that many, if not most, reported
56. As widely recognized, reported sexual crime comprises a minority of all
sexual crime. Nationwide, 34.8% of rapes and sexual assaults were reported to the
police in 2013. TRUMAN & LANGTON, supra note 6, at 7. This is an increase from
2012 (28.2% reported) and 2004 (29.3%). Sex crime rates are decreasing
nationwide. Id. In 2013, per 1000 persons age twelve or older, 23.2 individuals
were victims of rape and sexual assault crimes. Id. at 14. This is a decrease from
2012 (26.1) and 2004 (27.8). Id. Although reported sexual crime continues to be
but a fraction of all sexual crime, sexual crime rates appear to be decreasing with
no evidence of a decrease in reporting.
57. Jeffrey C. Sandler et al., Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of
New York State's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
&L. 284, 288 (2008).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 290.
60. See 1971-2013 REPORTED SEX OFENSES, supra note 6, at 1-2. In 2013, the
FBI implemented a new definition of "rape." Id. at 2. This renders 2013 data
somewhat difficult to compare to other years. See UCR Program Changes Definition
of Rape, FBI (Mar. 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/cjis-link/march-2012
/ucr-program-changes-definition-of-rape.
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sexual offenses comes from perpetrators who have yet to have a
first arrest or conviction for sexual offenses, so they would not have
been sex offenders coming out of prison referred for commitment
consideration.
As it is, many of the 60 offenders with three or more sex-
related convictions were of an age when risk decreases or were
persons in poor health, which also decreases risk. Others were
individuals with long periods of intensive sex offender-specific
probation after release, and no history suggesting unmanageability
with close monitoring by probation officers. These would have
been factors counting against recommendation in Florida.61
Despite this, the sexual recidivism rate in Florida for offenders
not recommended for commitment is low by any realistic standard
of appraising rates associated with crime control measures, at 2%-
4% (with an average release time of six to seven years). For a group
of offenders who had been determined to be "not likely," this
percentage is far below 50%, as would be expected had offenders
determined to not meet the "likely" criterion been accurately
assessed.
At most, commitment will prevent only that amount of sexual
recidivism that comes from offenders who have enough
documented sexual criminal history (usually multiple convictions)
to earn a paraphilia diagnosis and occupy higher risk/score
actuarial categories. It will not prevent sexual recidivism by sex
offenders with less history, which comprise the vast majority of all
sex offenders and the majority of sexual reoffenders.62
61. This is not to say that only offenders with three or more sex-related
convictions meet criteria or that SVPP in Florida used three convictions as a
necessary condition. Much variety exists in the backgrounds of offenders where
sufficient evidence exists to determine eligibility for commitment (e.g., some
offenders with one to two convictions had cases where credible evidence was
available indicating other offenses; other offenders with just one conviction had
charges on other occasions; and so forth). Sometimes an offender is known to
have had many offenses and victims before finally receiving his or her first (and
only) conviction. The point is simply that, as a group, offenders for whom there is
enough evidence for experts to have reasonable certainty that they meet criteria
are often, though not always, individuals with more than two sex-related
convictions (among other factors).
62. Hindsight bias can seem compelling. If someone reoffends it would seem
only commonsense that the person was likely to reoffend at least at some point in
time prior to the re-offense. If the person was likely (at any prior time), then the
person met commitment criteria (before the re-offense). The person's mental
condition would seem to be a mental abnormality just by virtue of creating the
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With this in mind, the next step is to evaluate the accuracy of
the SVP risk assessments in identifying commitment-eligible
offenders. If the group of all offenders who were not determined to
meet the "likely" criterion (since implementation of the Act in
1999) show a sexual recidivism rate at or above 50% (at or above
39% for five years release time), then a significant number of
eligible persons were misidentified as non-eligible. The further
below 50% (or 39% for five years) this rate is, the better. If the rate
is significantly below threshold, and especially if it is far below, then
it is reasonable to conclude that the SVPP experts did reasonably
well identifying commitment-eligible sex offenders and
recommending them for commitment.
Before looking in detail at recidivism data, an important issue
should be addressed. This author has on multiple occasions heard
claims to the effect that "recidivism research is not a valid means of
evaluating the accuracy of commitment eligibility determinations
or the effectiveness of commitment programs." The reason is that
"those sex offenders are reoffending; they are just not getting
caught." This is basically an attack on the use of proxy indicators in
criminal behavior research.
This author has heard similar claims from experts in Florida
accustomed to making commitment determinations on the basis of
the high actuarial rates listed for the Static-99, but frustrated by the
lower rates on revised Static-99R and even lower rates found in
research studies like the ones to be discussed here. The position
appears to be that actuarial instruments that are based on
recidivism research utilizing proxy indicators are useful when they
provide rates high enough for easy and seemingly judgment-free,
objective "likely" determinations. But when actuarial rates are not
this high, they "underestimate risk" and require "adjustment" to
reflect the "true" probability of reoffending. Comparable reasoning
internal psychological conditions allowing this likelihood. Although true at some
level, the problem of predicting when someone will, at some future date, become
likely to commit a crime is exactly the same as the problem of predicting the crime
itself. And barring an extreme form of determinism with respect to behavior and
events, it does not follow that a reoffender was likely to reoffend all along, even
years ahead of time, much less that an evaluator had sufficient evidence to detect
this likelihood at the time of commitment consideration. Many common
criminals, generally aggressive and impulsive across domains, will become likely to
do a sexually violent act in a short period of time just prior to the act, much like
they become likely to do other opportunistic crimes.
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can be heard (in this author's experience) within state agencies: if
recidivism data showed high rates, this would support more action
to protect the public. If data showed low rates, this means the
measures were invalid.
E. Are Proxy Indicators Misleading?
Empirical research is necessarily reliant on proxy indicators to
observe natural phenomena not directly (or continuously)
observable. Clearly, there are sexual offenses that do not elicit
arrests; many are not even reported. This means that arrests and
convictions are not a good proxy indicator of how many sex offenses
there are, or the number of new offenses by persons with previous
offenses.
However, arrests and convictions can be good indicators of
how many (new) reoffenders there are when the offenders being
studied are individuals who have already demonstrated a
conspicuous failure to maintain a pattern of offending without
acquiring charges or convictions. These are the offenders who are
providing empirical indication of lacking skill in evading (at least
eventual) detection. The recidivism studies to be discussed
examined sex offenders recommended for commitment but
released (mostly) without commitment. These are offenders who,
typically, had enough sexual criminal history to meet clinical
diagnostic criteria for a sexual deviance disorder (paraphilia) and
earn a high actuarial score. In general, this would have required
multiple convictions for sex-related offending.
If an offender already has detected sexual offenses-multiple
detections in fact-what logical or empirical reason is there to
think that he would now, after his most recent release, learn to
offend without detection? After all, his past failures to escape
detection (for many of these offenders) occurred during decades
in which it was easier to offend without detection. Until the 1990s
there were fewer sex offender restrictions, less use of sex offender
specific intensive probation, less severe sanctions (i.e., shorter
prison terms), and less public awareness. Even if there are some
such individuals, what reason exists to think that their number is so
high that rates would be significantly higher if they were accounted
for?
Recidivism research is, more precisely, recidivist research, or
research into how many offenders recidivate, or recidivate yet
again, after their most recent release. It is informative for risk
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assessment, because the risk being assessed in a psychosexual
evaluation is risk of becoming a (new) sexual reoffender. It is not
the risk of a new offense occurring at all, perpetrated by anyone.
Given their histories, the offenders studied by OPPAGA (and
SVPP) represent exactly those sex offenders expected to be
detected as a new recidivist by means of a proxy indicator (a new
charge or conviction) if they continue their pattern of repetitive
sexual offenses. They may well have new offenses that escape
detection. But it only takes the detection of one offense to make it
possible to observe an individual's status as a (new) sexual
recidivist. Their status is now known, whether they have one
hundred new offenses orjust one.
If a group of offenders with multiple past charges/convictions
is found to have a low rate of offenders observed to have become
recidivists (by means of obtaining a new charge/conviction), then
the most parsimonious explanation for why the rate is low is that
the vast majority of these individuals did not sexually reoffend.
What about the offenders not recommended for commitment?
These offenders would typically have had much less prior sexual
criminal history. They would have to have had at least one previous
sex offense-related conviction to meet the first criterion for
commitment (and therefore to be referred for commitment
consideration). But a great many offenders referred for
commitment consideration have just one known sex offense
conviction. Compared to offenders with multiple convictions, it is
reasonable to think the one-to-two-conviction group has
proportionally more offenders who offend infrequently or just
once, as opposed to being driven by sexual disturbance to offend
repeatedly. Because they offend less frequently, they are relatively
more likely than the repeat offenders to have just one new offense
if they reoffend at all and escape detection. For this reason,
samples of offenders with lower scores are apt to see their
recidivism rates increase the most if undetected reoffenders were
included with the reoffenders who obtained a new charge or
conviction. But they are also, as a group, the least prone to
continue sexual offending. This is consistent with a decline in
reported sexual crime in Florida of almost 50% between 1993 and
2012, from 101 reported sex crimes per 100,000 state residents to
53. Altogether, there is no reason to think that the number of
63. 1971-2013 REPORTED SEX OFFENSES, supra note 6.
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undetected reoffenders in this group is large, such that their
reconviction or new charge rate would increase significantly if
undetected reoffenders were included.&'
Finally, this author has also heard the claim that the average
sex offender has "hundreds" of victims. In a similar vein, one
Australian parliamentarian described sex offenders as "beings of a
subhuman category . . . [they are] . . . the least rehabilitatable
people .... ." Urban legends about typical sex offenders being
prolific predators stem in part from misinterpretation of polygraph
studies, now decades old, where a few outlier offenders reported
extremely high numbers. This elevates the mean or average
number for the group despite the fact that most offenders reported
far fewer victims. In one study, the average number of victims for
non-incest pedophile offenders with female victims was reported to
be 20 victims. The average number for offenders with male victims
was 150! In contrast, the median numbers for these offenders were
1.3 and 4.4 victims.66 A group victim average in the hundreds (when
most offenders in the sample had far fewer) is easily distorted to
imply that each sex offender, or the typical offender, has a large
number of victims.
64. Common beliefs about sexual crime are often the exact opposite of the
truth. It is perhaps counterintuitive, but the sex offenders most likely to offend
without getting caught (perhaps ever) are those, as a group, with the fewest
offenses and least entrenched sexual drive to offend. This is because, all else being
equal, less frequent offending carries less risk of (eventual) detection than more
frequent offending. This is why it is low score actuarial categories where risk of
actual recidivism is, relatively speaking, more likely to be underestimated by using
rates of observed recidivism as a proxy indicator. In absolute terms, however, the
degree of underestimation is still not likely to be much. See generally David
Finkelhor & Lisa Jones, Why Have Child Maltreatment and Child Victimization
Declined?, 62 J. Soc. ISSUES 685 (2006). The report shows a 49% decline in child
sexual abuse from 1990 to 2004. Id. at 685.
65. Kelly Richards, Misperceptions About Child Sex Offenders, 429 TRENDS &
ISSUES CRIME & CRIM.JUST. 1, 4 (2011) (quoting SA, Parliamentary Debates, House
of Representatives, 29June 2010, 533 (Ann Bressington) (Austl.)).
66. Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 17 (1987). These averages were reported in ANNA C.
SALTER, PREDATORS: PEDOPHILES, RAPISTS & OTHER SEX OFFENDERS: WHO THEY ARE,
How THEY OPERATE, AND How WE CAN PROTECT OURSELVES AND OUR CHILDREN 11
(2004). See also Richards, supra note 65, at 4-5 (discussing the misperception that
sex offenders have high recidivism rates and other myths). The difference between
an average and a median can be seen in the following example: Consider the
series of five numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 100). The average is 22 (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 -+ 100 = 110;
110/5 = 22). The median is 3, which is the middle number in the series.
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
In sum, although it is true that proxy indicators detect only a
fraction of all the sexual offenses that occur (mostly because the
majority of sexual offending comes from persons not yet arrested a
first time), they are likely to detect most if not all of those offenders
who become recidivists once again, after multiple previous
detections. In other words, although charges and convictions will
detect relatively few first time sex offenders, they are likely to miss
relatively few offenders recommended for commitment, if the latter
offend again.
III. SELECTION EFFICACY
A. How Well Are Commitment-Eligible Persons Being Identified?
SVPP has yet to complete its study of offenders not
recommended for commitment. Data on felony sex offense
reconviction rates for offenders selected for face-to-face evaluation
but not recommended are discussed at a later point (for purposes
of a different kind of comparison). However, a newspaper series
published in August 2013 reported relevant data on all offenders
ever considered for commitment since 1999. On August 18, 2013,
the Sun Sentinel published Sex Predators Unleashed by Sally Kestin and
Dana Williams. The authors conducted a survey of sexual
recidivism data for all sex offenders referred for commitment
consideration but later released.c) The survey evaluated data
obtained from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
69
The story cited raw total numbers of offenders found to have
new sex-related convictions or charges after being released without
a commitment recommendation. 9 It did not discuss the relevance
of sample size in the main body of the story or the importance of
recidivism rates in assessing accuracy in risk assessment. But rates
can be calculated from reported data, supplemented by data from
the SVPP database. Rates tell a much different story than raw
71
sums.
67. Kestin & Williams, supra note 2.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See infra Appendix (addressing how the story deals with the issue of
sample size).
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According to the SVPP database, a total of 31,626 offenders
have been referred for commitment consideration between 1999
and the summer of 2013 (when the newspaper series was
published).72 A total of 1532 offenders (4.8%) were recommended
for commitment. 73 A total of 30,094 were not recommended.71 The
average release time for this group has not been calculated, but it is
likely to be six to seven years, making it comparable to (much
smaller) samples of released offenders examined in other studies.
The series reported that a total of 594 offenders out of the
grand total obtained a new conviction for sexual offenses after
release. 5 A total of 1384 offenders obtained new sex-related
charges (which includes the 594 with convictions). 6 Using the
sample size cited above, this is a sex offense reconviction rate
(the percentage of offenders who were reconvicted) of 1.88%
(594 / 31,626 x 100). The new sex-related charge rate (the
percentage of offenders obtaining at least a new charge) using the
above-cited sample size calculates to 4.38% (1384 / 31,626 x 100).
The series reported a total of 121 of the 594 reconvicted offenders
committed another rape (0.4% of the 31,626)." A total of 14
individuals (0.04%) murdered the victim.7"
These figures include both recommended and non-
recommended offenders. As noted, 1532 offenders out of the
31,626 were recommended for commitment between 1999 and
2013. 79 This leaves 30,094 offenders considered but not
recommended. s° As will be discussed,' the SVPP study, which
examined released offenders who had been recommended (710),
found a total of 32 offenders who had obtained a new sex offense
82conviction after release . A total of 71 offenders had obtained at
813
least a new sex-related charge. The remaining 562 reconvicted
offenders and 1313 offenders with a new charge come from the
72. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Kestin & Williams, supra note 2.
76. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
77. Kestin & Williams, supra note 2.
78. Id.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
80. See supra text accompanying note 74.
81. See infra Part III.B.6.
82. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
83. Id.
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30,094 offenders not recommended.8' Given the very large samples
and much smaller reoffender totals, the reconviction rate (4.36%)
and new charge rate (1.88%) for non-recommended offenders are
scarcely different from those for the entire sample.
1. Comparison to Sexual Recidivism Rates in Other States
These rates are similar to rates for average (non-committed)
sex offenders in Florida found in other studies, as well as the rates
found in other states. If a significant number of sexual predators
had been missed over the years (eligible offenders misidentified as
ineligible), it would be reasonable to expect that the release of
these atypical, dangerous offenders would have resulted in a
Florida recidivism rate higher than in other states, especially states
with a proportionally higher number of sex offenders civilly•85
confined after the end of their sentence (e.g., Minnesota). In fact,
84. Id.
85. According to a recent survey of SVP programs conducted by the Sex
Offender Civil Commitment Programs Network (SOCCPN), Minnesota commits a
higher percentage of its sex offenders (and population generally) than any other
state with an SVP program responding to the survey. Jennifer E. Schneider et al.,
SOCCPN Annual Survey of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs 2014, SEX
OFFENDER CiV. COMMITMENT PROGRAMS NETWORK 6 (Oct. 27, 2014), http://soccpn
.org/images/SOCCPNAnnualSurvey_2014_revised.pdf. Seventeen programs
responded to the survey, id. at 7, out of the twenty states with SVP laws; the twenty-
first program is federal. This survey is cited in the recently released review of the
Minnesota SVP program (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, or MSOP) conducted
by an expert panel (the Panel) appointed by a federal judge. Rule 706 Expert
Report and Recommendations passim, Karsjens v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs.,
No. 0:11-CV-03659 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2014). "On December 6, 2013 the Court
appointed Dr. Naomi J. Freeman, Dr. Michael H. Miner, Ms. Deborah J.
McCulloch and Dr. Robin J. Wilson as experts pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence." Id. at 1. According to the Panel, Minnesota currently has 721
civilly committed individuals, a number that is substantially higher, per capita,
than the census for any other state with a sex offender-specific civil commitment
law. Id. at 74-75. According to the 2014 SOCCPN survey, Minnesota's civil
commitment rate, per million state residents, is 128.6 persons. Schneider et al.,
supra, at 6. The next highest state, North Dakota, has a commitment rate of 77.8
persons per million state residents. Id. California and New York both have a
commitment rate of 15 persons per million state residents. Id. Florida civilly
confines 29 persons per million (through its SVP statute). Id. Wisconsin has a
commitment rate of 53.7 persons per million. Id. Minnesota's rate is 4.4 times that
of Florida.
"[M]ost SOCC states recommend 3% to 4% of all cases reviewed for civil
commitment consideration, with 1% to 2% ultimately being civilly committed.
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the 2%-4% Florida rate is comparable, if not lower than, rates for
average sex offenders released from prison without commitment in
other states.
A 2012 Adam Walsh study of average sex offenders released
from prison in four states, including Florida, found a 5.2% sexual
recidivism rate (new charges) for a random sample of Florida sex
offenders released for five years. A sample of average sex offenders
released for ten years was found to have a 13.7% rate. Five- and ten-
year rates for other states are reported to be 7% and 12.9% for
Minnesota, 3.5% and 8.32% for NewJersey, and 4.1% and 7% for
South Carolina. s 6 The samples are much smaller (250-500) than
the group examined by the Florida Sun Sentinel; however, rates are
comparable or higher than the 2%-4% discussed.
Other studies have found similar results: A sample of 746
Connecticut offenders was found to have a 3.6% sexual recidivism
rate within five years of release.8' A sample of unsupervised sex
offenders in Texas had a 5.5% rate of obtaining new sex-related
charges or convictions within five years of release. The supervised
offenders in this sample (3.4% of the total) had a 2% rate. ' A
sample of sex offenders in Washington was found to have a 2.7%
sex offense reconviction rate within five years of release. 90 A sample
of sex offenders released from prison in Minnesota had a 10% sex-
related reconviction rate and a 12% new-charge rate (average
release time of 8.4 years).9' These rates are in line with Florida
rates, if not higher.
However, assessment data from Minnesota indicate that 9% of cases screened are
referred to the County Attorney for civil commitment .... " Rule 706 Expert
Report and Recommendations, supra, at 75. The Panel noted that county attorneys
in Minnesota have the ability to file civil commitment petitions for cases not
referred to them, which means that the percentage might be higher. See id.
According to the Panel, both the per capita rates and the screening and
commitment numbers support the Panel's observation that there are individuals
currently committed in Minnesota who likely do not meet commitment criteria.
Id. The Panel interprets these numbers as emphasizing issues with the SVP
screening and assessment process in Minnesota, as well as the standards for
commitment in that state. Id.
86. Sexual recidivism rates for each state studied are presented in ZcOGsA ET
AL., supra note 7, at 20-21. For average Static-99R scores, see id. at 21.
87. KuzYK, supra note 7, at 4.
88. Boccaccini et al., supra note 7, at 301.
89. Id.
90. BARN OsI, supra note 7, at 2.
91. MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 7, at 20.
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2. What a Low Sexual Recidivism Rate Means for How Well Experts
Identified Predators
What does a 2%-4% sexual recidivism rate for the over 30,000
offenders not recommended for commitment mean for accuracy in
identifying offenders in the "likely" group?
Given that most offenders who reoffend will not meet
commitment criteria ahead of time, it follows that only a small
fraction of offenders with new sex offense convictions or charges
would have had enough sexual criminal history to meet criteria
ahead of time. These would be the commitment-eligible offenders
who were missed or misidentified as non-eligible. Thus, instead of
2%-4% of offenders in the over 30,000 offenders considered to be
missed predators (according to one approach to evaluating SVP
risk assessment accuracy), the actual number of genuinely eligible
offenders missed comprised a minority fraction of the already small
fraction (2%-4%) of all offenders considered for commitment
(likely less than 1%).
It should be noted that just as there are criteria-ineligible
offenders in the sample of all offenders considered for
commitment who did reoffend, it is possible there were
commitment-eligible offenders not identified as such who did not
reoffend. So it should not be assumed, necessarily, that offenders
who did not reoffend are persons who did not meet commitment
criteria ahead of time. But given the description of commitment-
eligible offenders provided by lawmakers,92 and the kind of mental
condition referred to by the second and third criteria for
commitment, the number of genuinely eligible offenders who were
likely to refrain from offending if released is likely to be small.
Commitment-eligible offenders are also supposed to be not only
motivated to continue offending, but impaired by disorder to the
point where they would have great difficulty not offending, even if
they tried. It is hard to imagine more than a few among the "small
but extremely dangerous number"9S of predators exerting enough
willpower to stop offending entirely, even if they could make such a
92. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.912, .917 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255
(End) of the 2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Spec. "A" Sess. of the 23d Leg.) (providing a
definition of a sexually violent predator and that upon a court determination that
a person is a sexually violent predator, the "person shall be committed to the
custody of the Department of Children and Families").
93. Id. § 394.910 (Westlaw).
[Vol. 41:3
35
Montaldi: A Study of the Efficacy of the Sexually Violent Predator Act in F
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
2015] EFFICACY OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT 815
decision effectively. The number of offenders is a reasonably fair
estimate of the number of offenders who were not eligible for
commitment ahead of time.
The same cannot be said about offenders who do not meet
criteria but do reoffend. Most offenders belong to a peer group for
which commitment criteria are not met. Most reoffenders are
located in this group. On the reasonable assumption that very few
persons who do meet criteria would not be reoffenders if released, it
is very likely that the number of reoffenders who were predators,
but not identified, is a minority fraction of the 594 reconvicted
offenders and 1838 offenders with new charges, or a fraction of the
2%-4%.
A large group of "not likely" offenders showing a 2%-4%
sexual recidivism rate is strong evidence of a high level of accuracy
in identifying commitment-eligible sex offenders. Such a rate is far
below 50% and even 39% (for five years release time)." Failure to
identify an offender who actually did meet criteria-the outcome
being a released predator-is highly undesirable, as that offender is
likely to harm a new victim or victims. From a policy perspective,
however, a rate this low is likely to be as good as it gets in the real
world, especially considering the fact that risk assessment is
probabilistic and approximate at best, rather than a precise method
of consistently accurate prediction.
In contrast, there was poor accuracy in identifying those
persons who did not meet commitment criteria. The next section
discusses data showing this to be true.
B. How Well Are Non-Eligible Persons Being Identified?
1. The OPPAGA Study of Offenders with Settlement Agreements
The SVPP study was inspired in part by the unexpected
findings by OPPAGA researchers studying recidivism by offenders
recommended for commitment but granted conditional release by
the courts. 5 SVPP worked closely with OPPAGA on the project.
The OPPAGA study examined all offenders ever granted
94. See supra Part II.C. (discussing that in the study, researchers would look at
a group of "not likely" offenders who were released to see if their reconviction rate
is indeed below 50% (or below 39% for five years release time), and noting that it
is preferred that this rate be as far below 50% as possible).
95. OPPAGA Memo, supra note 3.
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conditional release pursuant to a settlement agreement in the State
of Florida who had at least one year of release time by October
2011 (140 offenders).9 6 Average release time for this sample is
unknown but likely to be at least five years.97
2. Settlement Agreements in Florida
The fact that any offenders recommended for commitment in
Florida have obtained conditional release agreements might seem
odd given legislative findings that persons subject to the Act are not
appropriate for less restrictive alternative strategies. Generally,
when the courts find someone to be a sexually violent predator, a
commitment order is entered which directs the person to be
transferred into DCF custody for confinement at the Florida Civil
Commitment Center (FCCC) at end-of-sentence. Sexually violent
predators are defined as persons likely to reoffend "if notr- .,,98
confined. A person who is dangerous if left free but not if he is
supervised is not a sexually violent predator in Florida, and thus
not subject to civil measures of control. The introduction of a
formal Less Restrictive Alternatives option into the Florida SVP Act
would require the removal of this phrase from the key definition.
At the same time, the Act is a mental health law and therefore
civil rather than criminal. As a result, many Florida courts have
recognized agreements between the state and attorneys
representing offenders recommended for commitment. These are
agreements that the offender will be allowed release on several
conditions. One condition is that he must attend and complete
outpatient sex offender treatment in the community (at his
expense). The terms and conditions of settlement agreements
resemble probation plans with the exception of no community-
based structure (e.g., probation officer and GPS) unless the
offender already has probation. They are a kind of "probation lite."
In most of these cases, the ASA has filed a petition for
commitment based on the SVPP recommendation. The court has
made a probable cause finding and the offender is transferred to
96. Id. at 1-2.
97. Five years is a reasonable assumption given that 45% of the members of a
larger sample of persons with settlement agreements, examined by SVPP in 2012,
had release times in excess of five years, up to fourteen years. SVPP Data, supra
note 4.
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912 (Westlaw).
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the FCCC as a pre-trial detainee. However, the ASA may have
limited confidence that a jury trial will result in a commitment
finding. This is not because the ASA considers the offender no
longer dangerous or disagrees with SVPP's recommendation. The
reasons are more logistical and related to the mechanics of winning
a commitment verdict in the face of intense challenge by the
defense. The reasons for cases not moving forward (e.g., witnesses
are not available) have no clear relationship to risk. ASAs do not
conduct additional, more selective, or more accurate risk
assessment beyond what SVPP has done.99
Although possible, no empirical or logical reason exists to
assume that offenders recommended for commitment by SVPP but
able to get a settlement agreement are, collectively, at significantly
lower risk than other offenders recommended by experts using the
same methods, including those who were committed (or who
remain committed). Offenders with settlement agreements
therefore provide a window into the issue of whether persons
deemed by experts to be too dangerous for release are in fact this
dangerous. 100
99. On occasion, ASAs might arrange for one more evaluation to be
conducted when they are ready to decide to take a case forward, sometimes years
after the SVPP recommendation. These are often filed reviews only. However,
these evaluators use the same methods and standards as those utilized by SVPP.
They are often also on contract with DCF to conduct initial commitment
evaluations.
100. If the court approves the agreement, the offender (generally) stipulates
to being a sexually violent predator and the judge enters a commitment order.
The order is then "held in abeyance" or suspended (rendered temporarily
inactive). This allows the offender an opportunity to comply with the terms and
conditions of his agreement when released. If the agreement is violated, the court
may activate the order and commit the offender to FCCC without the state having
to go to trial. Some agreements are weaker. The offender does not stipulate to
more than the fact that the offender was deemed commitment eligible (by SVPP)
or that an evaluator has the opinion the offender meets criteria. No commitment
order is entered because there is no finding of SVP status. The commitment process
is suspended. If the offender violates the agreement the state may (or may not)
resume the process of attempting to get a commitment finding.
For those judges open to such agreements (not all are), the statutory
prohibition of conditional release is apparently seen as pertaining to persons
subject to active commitment orders. Persons "subject to the Act" are apparently
treated as including persons with probable cause findings only, absent approved
agreements (i.e., the typical pre-trial detainee), as well as individuals subject to
active commitment orders. If challenged about releasing predators, those judges
and state attorneys open to these agreements might argue that offenders with
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Florida DCF and SVPP are not involved in settlement
agreements and do not conduct evaluations of suitability for
conditional release. The SVPP multidisciplinary team had
determined all of these individuals to be unsuitable for an ' form of
release; thus, the recommendation for civil confinement.1
It is important to keep in mind that although the offenders in
this study were considered to be sexually violent predators by SVPP
experts (and OPPAGA refers to them as sexually violent predators),
they were not proven to meet commitment criteria in any case the
state presented before a jury, where the state's evidence was
subjected to challenge by the defense.
3. OPPA GA Findings
Researchers found that out of 140 offenders with settlement
agreements and at least one but up to ten years of release time, a
total of 5 individuals (3.6%) had obtained a new sex offense
conviction after release. No offender was found to have only a new
sex-related conviction. An additional 3 individuals had a new non-
sexual violence-related conviction (e.g., robbery, assault).02
A total of 23 additional offenders had obtained a new charge
of some kind.10 3 Eighteen offenders had their agreements revoked,
mostly for having obtained a new criminal conviction or charge,
but some for having failed to comply with release conditions (e.g.,
not attending treatment or having unauthorized proximity contact
settlement agreements are only at the probable cause stage of the process. No one
has yet proven these individuals are sexually violent predators. The stipulation to
being a sexually violent predator is essentially an agreement allowing the court to
treat the offender as a predator if the agreement is violated.
As will become clear, the OPPAGA data provide strong support for the claim
that in fact these judges and ASAs have been mostly right in their decisions. They
may have been entirely right, as it cannot be assumed that every reoffender was,
ahead of time, a sexually driven predator who truly met criteria for commitment.
101. When the offender does not have probation, the ASA is the only
monitor, dependent on regular treatment progress reports and periodic checks on
criminal databases, to see if an offender has obtained a new charge of any kind.
102. New offense and revocation data (sexual and non-sexual) for the
OPPAGA sample are presented in a section of the OPPAGA Memo, supra note 3,
at 5-6, entitled "Have Sexually Violent Predators With Stipulated Agreements
Committed New Crimes?" Offense data are current through September 22, 2011.
Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 5-6.
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with minors).1°4 Most offenders in the sample showed no apparent
indication of having returned to confinement for any reason.
The vast majority of offenders in this group gave no indication of
having new sexual offenses after release, or new offenses of any
kind.
This is an astonishing finding. How could the number of
reoffenders be so low for a group of "likely" offenders?
4. What Do OPPAGA Findings Mean for the Accuracy of Actuarial
Risk Assessments?
Only 5 sexual reoffenders out of 140 offenders detenrmined by
experts to be extremely dangerous can only mean that few of these
individuals were in fact dangerous when assessed. Every offender
with a settlement agreement had been seen as too dangerous for
any form of release, even the most intensively supervised. Yet the
vast majority proved to be manageable, most with little supervision.
This raises the issue of risk assessment methods and the validity
of actuarial instruments as measures of absolute risk, that is, the
absolute (non-comparative, stand-alone) likelihood of more
offending. SVPP experts in Florida, and nationwide, have been
heavily reliant on the Static-99 (and later 99R) for making "likely"
determinations. Actuarial assessment is the basis for considering
risk assessment to be empirical or scientific (hence objective) as
opposed to being purely subjective (as with "unguided" clinical
judgment).
Decades of research have found statistical or mechanical
(mathematical) methods superior to unguided clinical judgment in
differentiating persons with bad outcomes (e.g., reconviction) from
persons without bad outcomes. 0 ' At the same time, although this
research supports the use of actuarial/statistical methods, it leaves
open the question of exactly how these methods are to be used.
Should they be used to make claims about the absolute risk of an
individual offender? This has been common practice in SVP
evaluations for many years, and it is why evaluators have thought
their "likely" determinations are grounded in science. Or should
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See generally William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A
Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19 (2000).
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actuarial instruments be used to rank order categories or groups of
offenders according to relative risk for purposes of rational
allocation of risk management resources (which does not require
an individualized reoffense probability or absolute risk estimation
attached to each offender)? An argument can be made that the
methodology of this research produces findings supportive of the
latter only (i.e., category rank ordering according to relative
risk).10'
For SVPP, the OPPAGA findings illustrated the consequences
of interpreting comparative prediction research as supporting the
treatment of actuarial reconviction rates as absolute likelihoods
that could be applied to individual cases. Even if rates could be
treated as likelihoods, the OPPAGA rate showed that the listed
rates on the actuarial table for the Static-99 were grossly inflated, at
least in Florida, for sex offenders released since 1999. '09
Furthermore, rates for the revised Static-99R are also unreliable." 0
The next issue to consider is actuarial accuracy.
The average Static-99 score for offenders with settlement
agreements around this time (late 2011) was 5.91."' Most of these
offenders would have scored in the "high risk" range (6 or more).
According to listed reconviction rates for the Static-99 high-risk
sample, the OPPAGA sample would have been expected to have a
sex offense-related reconviction rate of 39% within five years of
release, which is the release period most appropriate for
comparison.'1 2 In other words, 39% of offenders with similar scores
can be expected to become reconvicted offenders within five years
if not confined. 113 If the actuarial table for the Static-99 had been a
108. For a detailed discussion of probability as it relates to sex offenders, see
generally 5 MICHAEL P. BEDNARZ ET AL., THE SEXUAL PREDATOR: LEGAL,
ADMINISTRATIVE, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT CONCERNS 1 (Anita Schlank ed.,
2014).
109. Compare HARRIS ET AL., supra note 47, app. 6, at 69 (predicted sexual
recidivism for high-risk offenders at least 39), with OPPAGA Memo, supra note 3,
at 5 (4% are repeat sexual offenders).
110. Brian R. Abbott, The Utility of Assessing "External Risk Factors" When Selecting
Static-99R Reference Group, OPEN ACCESSJ. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 102 (2013), http://
www.forensicpsychologyunbound.ws/OAJFP/Volume-5_2013_files/Abbott
%202013.pdf.
111. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
112. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 47, app. 6, at 6 9.
113. Id. The rate increases from a modest 6% to 7% every five years, to 45% at
ten years, and 52% at fifteen years. Id.
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valid measure of absolute risk for sex offenders in Florida finishing
prison sentences after 1999, the percentage of OPPAGA offenders
expected to have a new sex-related conviction if released would be
more than a third (at least), which would be more than 40
offenders. The actual number of felony sex offenders was 5.' 1
4
The inflation effect is stark even if the comparison analysis is
more finely tuned. The Static-99R, or the revision made to the
original instrument in light of more recent research, provides an
interesting comparison. The 99R came out in 2009 and lists lower
rates per score than the original Static-99."5 An interesting question
is whether rates for the revised instrument are still inflated,
regardless of reference group.
The SVPP began using the 99R at that time. Part of the reason
for the revision was the instability (variability) in rates per score
being observed by the instrument's developers in samples released
more recently than the samples used to develop the original
instrument. Additionally, more recent research was showing that
advancing age had a more significant effect on decreasing rates
(risk) than had been previously realized."' The revised Static better
accounted for this age effect, as well as listing rates per score for
different reference groups rather than forjust one.
It is common practice to treat offenders selected for full SVP
evaluation as most similar to the offenders who made up the High
114. OPPAGA Memo, supra note 3, at 5.
115. See ZGOBA ET AL., supra note 7, at 26.
116. Jay P. Singh et al., Rates of Sexual Recidivism in High Risk Sex Offenders: A
Meta-Analysis of 10,422 Participants, SEXUAL-OFFENDER-TREATMENT.ORG (2012),
http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/108.html.
117. In contrast to Static-99 reconviction rates, which were observed in one
sample of offenders with scores in the same range, rates for the Static-99R are
predicted based on a logistic regression analysis of offenders with different scores
grouped together. See PHENIX ET AL., supra note 47, at 5-11. The STATic-99R &
STATIC-2002R: EVALUATORS' WORKBOOK contains a bibliography of relevant studies.
Id. at 45-49. In contrast to the original Static-99, which had just one reference
group and one actuarial table, the Static-99R has four reference groups and thus
four actuarial tables. For example, predicted rates for the "High Risk/Need
Group" come from samples of offenders deemed higher risk overall than the
samples used to obtain rates for the other reference groups. This means that the
predicted rate listed for High Risk/Need Group offenders with a score of 6 is
higher than predicted rates for offenders in other reference groups who have a
score of 6. Unlike the Static-99, evaluators using the 99R must first decide which
reference group contained offenders most similar to the offender being assessed.
Only then will evaluators know which actuarial table to use.
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Risk/Need Group from the Static-99R. This is because they were
selected for additional evaluation by virtue of appearing to be at
higher than average risk on the first screening. Certainly, post-
evaluation, offenders who are recommended for commitment
comprise a group thought to be high risk. The High Risk/Need
Group is associated with the highest rates recorded for the Static-
99R.
What does the OPPAGA rate mean for the Static-99R? First,
there is the issue of how to adjust scores. Most offenders with
settlement agreements were assessed with the Static-99. Given its
better accounting for age, older offenders will often score lower on
the 99R than on the original Static-99. Many offenders in the
OPPAGA sample were in the age range of forties and fifties at time
of assessment. Static-99 scores were not translated into 99R scores
for the OPPAGA study. However, it is reasonable to assume that the
OPPAGA sample would have an average 99R score of about one
point lower than the Static-99 (5.91). A larger sample of offenders
with settlement agreements examined in the SVPP study had an
average 99R score of 5."' High Risk/Need Group individuals with
99R scores of 5 would be expected to have predicted five-year rates
of 25.2%. This is seven times the OPPAGA rate.
Analysis should also take into account that offenders with
settlement agreements spent at least some time in civil
confinement as detainees prior to conditional release. This means
that their release date (from any form of confinement) is later than
the date used for scoring the instrument at the time of
commitment consideration (date of prison release). Scores have
not yet been recalculated to account for this date change, so
precision is not yet possible. A generous assumption would be that
the average Static-99R score (5) would be lessened by an additional
point, accounting for additional increased age. This means that a
group of offenders with an average Static-99 score of 5.91 might
have an average Static-99R score of 4 (or 3.91), if date of release
from prison is changed to date of release from FCCC. The
predicted rate for High Risk/Need Group offenders with a score of
4 is 20.1%. This is still more than five times the OPPAGA rate.
The reference group with the lowest predicted rates on the
Static-99R is the Routine Group, or average sex offenders released
from prison. Routine Group offenders with a score of 4 are
118. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
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predicted to have rates of 8.7%. This is still significantly higher
than the OPPAGA rate (3.6%). Assuming an average score of 4
after adjusting for Static-99R versus Static-99 scores and date of
release from civil confinement versus end of prison sentence,
OPPAGA offenders are most similar to Routine Group offenders with a score
of 1 (3.8%).
Rate differences of this magnitude and consistency are not
likely to be chance or random phenomena, regardless of which
version of the Static-99 is used (and which reference group). Even
the low end of the 95% confidence interval for Routine Group
offenders with a score of 4 (6.2%-12.2%) exceeds the OPPAGA
119
rate.
Of course, individuals with settlement agreements have some
conditions attached to release (and about half had probation
officers for at least a while after release), which may not have been
true of the offenders in the original (and other) Static-99 samples.
However, the loosely structured release conditions of the OPPAGA
offenders would not seem to explain such a vast difference in rates.
And these offenders were supposedly an unusually dangerous
group, such that they would be expected to produce more
reoffenders than what would be expected from their actuarial score
taken in isolation. Instead, the rate is much lower, with most
offenders in the sample giving no indication of having been
returned to confinement.
The OPPAGA findings also have relevance for the issue of
relative risk, and whether the Static-99R might also have problems
as a rank order device. It is helpful to do a comparison of typical
Florida sex offenders released from prison at the end of a
sentence."" The OPPAGA sexual recidivism rate was 3.6% for a
group of supposedly atypical sex offenders with an average Static-
99R score of 4 (average release time of about five years). The
Florida offenders followed in the Adam Walsh study had a 5.2%
rate and an average Static-99R score of 1.97. In other words, the121
two groups are very similar despite different actuarial scores. For
119. For actuarial rates for the Static-99 (and rates with confidence intervals
for the Static-99R), see HARRIS ET AL., supra note 47, app. 6, at 69. See also PHENIX ET
AL., supra note 47, at 5-8.
120. See ZGOBA ET AL., supra note 7, at 1. For sexual recidivism rates for each
state studied, see id. at 20-21. For average Static-99R scores, see id. at 21.
121. It is not known how many of these offenders had probation to serve after
release. A minority probably did, given they are sex offenders.
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an instrument to function as a gauge of relative risk, higher scores
should correspond with significantly higher rates (even if rates per
score vary across samples). The score range here (2 to 4) is not
large, but at least some rate difference should be associated with
this difference in score. Problems are suggested even with respect
to gauging relative risk. 22
The OPPAGA findings from late 2011 provided the first
evidence that both the observed rates used to norm the Static-99
and predicted rates for the revised Static-99R are grossly inflated
for use with a recent sample of sex offenders local to Florida. This
is consistent with recent meta-analytical studies showing that rates
for especially higher risk actuarial categories vary widely across
samples, to the point where no empirical basis exists for treating
123rates as absolute probabilities (or measures of absolute risk). 2
In this author's opinion, the larger meaning to be found in
comparing the OPPAGA and Adam Walsh study rates is this: the
Florida SVPP, consisting of well-trained and dedicated experts
using nationally accepted best practices in risk assessment and
diagnostic evaluation, has not been able to distinguish a small
group of unusually dangerous sex offenders from average sex
122. By 2012, the developers of the Static were urging caution for evaluators
using the Static-99R to assess absolute risk, unless the evaluator had local norms
(i.e., rates per score based on the specific area and/or population of sex offenders
from which the person being evaluated comes). However, the developers appear
to have no reservations about the use of these instruments for assessing relative
risk. According to the developers, in contrast to the rate instability that they found
in their samples, there was more stability in the rank order of rates (i.e., samples of
higher scoring offenders consistently exhibited relatively higher rates than
samples of lower scoring offenders). The developers also recommend that
decisions concerning the density of external risk factors are also based on
structured, empirically validated risk tools. See generally Leslie Helmus et al.,
Absolute Recidivism Rates Predicted by Static-99R and Static-2002R Sex Offender Risk
Assessment Tools Vary Across Samples: A Meta-Analysis, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 1148
(2012), available at http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/Research-HelmusEtA] (2012)
ActuarialBaseRateVariability-2013-10-25.pdf. Problems raised by utilizing risk
factors external to an actuarial instrument for decision making about how to use
an actuarial instrument are discussed generally in Abbott, supra note 110.
123. See Singh et al., supra note 116. See generally SEENA FAZEL ET AL., USE OF
RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS TO PREDICT VIOLENCE AND ANTIsocIAL BEHAVIOUR IN
73 SAMPLES INVOLVING 24,827 PEOPLE: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW AND META-ANALYsIS 1
(2012), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/345/bmj.e4692.full.pdf. As
noted above, the developers of the Static are urging caution about using its rates
to assess absolute risk. See generally Helmus et al., supra note 122. They recommend
using rates as a gauge of relative risk. See generally id.
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offenders coming out of prison. It seems unlikely that a lower rate
would have been found if offenders had been chosen randomly for
recommendation and then given conditional release.
5. SVP Program Adjustments After the OPPAGA Study
After the OPPAGA study, the SVPP multidisciplinary team
believed it was no longer possible to have reasonable, professional
certainty in Static rates as a decisive, or even primary, consideration
in determining whether offenders met the "likely" criterion. For
the SVPP multidisciplinary team, this meant that, at most (and even
this was problematic), Static rates would support qualitative
statements about relative category/group risk. These would be
statements like the following: Offenders with higher scores are, all
else equal, relatively more likely to be reconvicted than offenders
with lower scores. Unfortunately for any purely mechanical
approach to "likely" determinations, estimation of relative risk does
not have direct bearing on the absolute question of whether a
particular individual is more likely than not to continue
committing sexual offenses.
After becoming aware of the OPPAGA findings, the
multidisciplinary team began giving more balanced consideration
to a range of factors, mostly clinical, as well as actuarial, in
determining whether offenders met the "likely" criterion. A higher
score on the Static-99R meant that relatively less clinical evidence
might be required to make the case for a "likely" determination
than if the score was lower (given that higher scoring offenders
were relatively more likely to be dangerous), but no actuarial score
and associated rate could settle the issue. The team also gave more
attention to the description of a sexually violent predator provided
by lawmakers.
At no point did the team ever adopt as a policy a reduction in
the number of offenders recommended for commitment. Just as
they had always been, cases were considered individually, on their
own merits. What changed was a loss of confidence in actuarial
rates as a dominant factor in "likely" determinations. Without the
Static as a measure of absolute risk, case analysis was forced into
greater complexity and nuance. Case consideration became more,
rather than less, individualized, while still considering all risk
factors supported by empirical research. This meant that experts
would have much more difficulty (especially for a team of six
psychologists with one vote each) achieving reasonable professional
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certainty about which offenders were likely to continue offending if
not confined. The cumulative result of more difficult decisions was
fewer cases being recommended for commitment.
At the same time, the multidisciplinary team believed that for
those cases that were recommended, at least the clinical case for
recommendation was now much stronger than in previous years.
Compared to past years, when only 47% of recommended cases
were taken to trial and then commitment, 2 4 the team believed that
cases would now become more likely to go to trial and result in
successful commitment.
Greater selectivity in eligibility determinations does increase
the chance (at least somewhat) that an offender who will reoffend
will not be committed. But it also increases the chances that an
offender, carefully determined to be dangerous, will have a case
strong enough to earn commitment at trial. The community is
protected by the commitment of genuinely dangerous persons, not
by high numbers of questionable recommendations based on
inflated actuarial rates. a
6. The SVPP Recidivism Study
The OPPAGA findings made it clear that the time was right for
SVPP to initiate the study mandated by statute. SVPP began the
study in 2012 and used the end of February 2013 as a cut-off date.
Offenders released by that date would be included in the study.
Individuals released thereafter would be studied at a later point.
The SVPP study examined a much larger sample than that used by
the OPPAGA, one that contained not only offenders with
settlement agreements but also offenders recommended for
commitment but discharged unconditionally. SVPP also studied
formerly committed offenders.
Statistical analysis of descriptive rate data has not been
completed. 26 Researchers are working on this as well as obtaining
data on recidivism since 2013 and offenders released since then. As
124. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
125. In other words, even if it were correct to interpret actuarial rates as
absolute likelihoods or probabilities relevant to sex offense reconviction, whether
applicable to offenders in groups or as individual cases, the OPPAGA data show
that the rates currently listed for the Static-99/99R would not be accurate. See
OPPAGA Memo, supra note 3.
126. For example, the rates listed here are raw descriptive rates. Survival
analysis has yet to be conducted.
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such, this present discussion should be considered preliminary.
However, in recidivism research, rate data tell the story. Rates are
now known for a large sample of offenders. As will be discussed,
rates for subsets of recommended offenders are generally at or
below 10% and differences in rates across subsets are small.' This
provides strongly suggestive evidence, or at least evidence that
supports a number of conclusions about the efficacy of risk
assessment methods and SVP commitment in general, in a large
state. Given that these methods are used in every state with an SVP
law, and Florida sex offenders are little different from sex offenders
in other states, Florida findings have significant ramifications for
SVP policies in any state."'
7. The SVPP Sample
The SVPP sample consisted of offenders recommended for
commitment but released from inception of the Act in 1999 to the
end of February 2013 (710 offenders)."9 Most offenders in the
study (610) were recommended but released without commitment
(and without treatment), either from prison at end-of-sentence (no
petition filed) or from the FCCC as detainees not taken to trial (a
few went to trial but were not committed by the jury). 30 The
remainder (100 offenders) were both recommended and
committed, but later released at annual review after a court found
that they no longer met criteria for commitment. 3' Most of these
individuals would have had years of inpatient treatment before
discharge. A total of 39 individuals out of the 100 formerly
committed offenders had reached the final phase of treatment
prior to release (Phase IV), with 16 offenders having achieved
127. See infra Part III.B. 11.
128. Rates are especially close for Florida and Minnesota offenders studied by
Adam Walsh researchers. See ZGOBA ET AL., supra note 7, at 20-21 (noting Florida's
rates for five- and ten-year release times as 5.2% and 13.7% respectively, while
Minnesota's comparable rates are 7% and 12.9%). For sexual recidivism rates for
each state studied, see id. at 20-21. For average Static-99R scores, see id. at 21.
129. SVPP Data, supra note 4. An additional 52 recommended offenders from
this period have been found since the end of the study. Id. Of these, 2 obtained a
new sex-related charge or conviction. Id. New rates have yet to be calculated, but
rates are not likely to change substantially with so few additional reoffenders.
130. Id. According to the SVPP Database, approximately 90% of cases taken to
trial result in commitment. Id.
131. Id.
48
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Maximum Therapeutic Benefit (MTB) as determined by the FCCC
132
treatment program.
For the entire sample of recommended offenders later
released, 170 offenders were released between ten and fourteen
years ago. 133 A total of 251 offenders were released between five andten years ago. 13' A total of 134 offenders were released between
three and five years ago. 115 Finally, 155 offenders were released
within the past three years (prior to February 2013).136 Precise
breakdowns of release times by subset of recommended offenders
have yet to be calculated. Most of the formerly committed
offenders are included within the offenders released within the
past three years.
The majority of offenders in the sample (466 out of 710, or
66%) gave no indication of having spent even a month and a day
back in prison for any new offense, including non-sexual offenses
and probation violations.13 7 As noted with the OPPAGA sample, this
cuts against the hypothesis that low rates are merely the result of
132. Id. The determination that someone has achieved MTB status is not the
same thing as concluding that someone no longer meets criteria for commitment
(NLM). Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226, 234 (Fla. 2012). FCCC evaluators address
treatment progress only, not NLM issues. Those issues are left for evaluators hired
by the state and the defense at the annual review. An MTB determination means
only that the individual has progressed as far as can be reasonably expected of
someone participating in a comprehensive treatment program in a secure facility
where no opportunities exist to observe the treatment participant applying
treatment knowledge and concepts in real-life settings. Id. Speaking from this
author's experience as the Director of the SVP facility in Arizona, such
opportunities exist when a treatment program is able to integrate a gradual
community reintegration component into its more advanced phases. This was
done in Arizona when this author was there.
133. SVPP Data, supra note 4. The relevant release date for this study is the
date the offender was released from the most recent period of confinement
during which he was recommended for commitment. Id. Some offenders were
returned to prison after that date, for various reasons, and may have additional,
more recent release dates. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The Department of Corrections is responsible for probation
supervision in Florida. Introduction to Community Corrections, FLA. DEP'T CORR.,
http://www.dc.sate.fl.us/facilities/comcor/index.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2014). Confinement sanctions for probation violations are therefore served in
prison, even for periods of less than one year.
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large numbers of offenders quickly ending up back in confinement
for long periods.
13
There are four subsets of offenders recommended for
commitment but later released by the courts:
(1) The first subset comprises offenders recommended for
commitment but released directly from prison at end-of-
sentence (83 offenders). These are individuals for whom a
petition for commitment was not filed. Without a petition, a
court cannot find probable cause to believe that the person is
a sexually violent predator. Without a probable cause finding,
a court will not enter an order directing the offender's transfer
to the FCCC at the end of his sentence. Most of these releases
occurred during the very early years of the Act. Within a few
years, ASAs filed petitions whenever the SVPP recommended
that a petition be filed. These offenders would not have
received sex offender-specific inpatient treatment or, for the
most part, have been required to attend outpatient treatment.
(2) The second subset encompasses offenders recommended for
commitment and sent to the FCCC as pre-trial detainees (366
offenders). ASAs filed commitment petitions for these
individuals, and courts found probable cause that these
individuals were sexually violent predators. They were then
transferred to FCCC as pre-trial detainees at the end of their
sentences. At a later point, the ASAs for these cases made the
decision not to take them to trial and the cases were dropped.
The courts would have granted full discharge (release without
conditions). Few if any of these individuals would have
participated in sex offender-specific treatment.39
(3) The third subset includes offenders recommended for
commitment but granted conditional release by the courts
pursuant to settlement agreements (161, a number that
includes the 140 offenders in the OPPAGA sample). Most of
these individuals were detainees when they entered into
agreements. These offenders would have been required to
138. See OPPAGA Memo, supra note 3.
139. FCCC does offer some general treatment programming to detainees
focusing on criminal thinking and lifestyle. Some of the released detainees would
have participated in this programming. A very small number of detainees (less
than ten) were allowed to participate in full sex offender treatment in the early
years of the Act.
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participate in outpatient sex offender treatment with a
community-based private provider (and sometimes substance
abuse) at the offender's expense. How many did so, and how
many completed a treatment program, is unknown." ° Based
on the OPPAGA sample, about half of these offenders would
have had some time on probation after release. 4' Some would
have had sex offender-specific probation.
(4) The fourth subset includes offenders who were committed but
later found by a court to no longer meet criteria for
commitment (100 offenders). These individuals would, for
the most part, have been granted full discharge (with a small
number having conditions attached to release pursuant to a
settlement agreement). Typically, these individuals would have
participated in years of inpatient sex offender-specific
treatment at the state's expense.
Recommended offenders released directly from prison have
the longest release times: 86% released five to fourteen years and
7% released three years or less."13 They were the youngest at release
(average age forty-two) and had the highest average Static-99R
score (5.3) .f44
Discharged detainees have the next longest release times: 66%
released five to fourteen years; 17% released three years or less.
45
They were somewhat older at release (average age forty-five) and
had the next highest average Static-99R score (5.1).'16
Offenders with settlement agreements have somewhat less time
in the community on average: 45% released five to fourteen years
and 21% released three years or less. 47 They were somewhat older
140. Offenders on conditional release who complete an outpatient program
may petition the court for full discharge. LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the
Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for
Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SFATrLE U. L. Rrv. 373, 422 & n.275 (2000). Only a few
offenders with settlement agreements appear to have been discharged (as of
February 2013).
141. See OPPAGA Memo, supra note 3.
142. SVPP Data, supra note 4. As of February 2013, this number would be
approaching 120, if not higher. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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than detainees at release (forty-six) and have somewhat lower
average Static-99R scores (5.0) .
Formerly committed offenders have, on average, the least
amount of time in the community since release: 27% released over
five years and 51% released zero to three years. 49 They were also
the oldest at release (average age fifty) and had the lowest average
Staic-99R score (4.5) .'50 This group would be expected to have the
lowest sexual recidivism rate just based on these factors, without
taking treatment into account.
8. SVPP Findings
A total of 71 out of 710 offenders in the original sample (10%)
obtained a new sex-related charge (with victim) after release from
the period of incarceration during which they were considered for
commitment. 51 Of these 71 offenders, 32 had a new felony sex
offense conviction (4.5%) .52 An additional 9 offenders had a new
conviction for a sexually motivated offense related to a non-sexual
charge, for a total of 41 offenders with a new felony conviction for a
crime with sexual elements (5.8%).5:
A total of 19 offenders had felony charges either pending or
acquitted. 154 Five other offenders had sex-related misdemeanor
convictions, and an additional 6 offenders had sex-related
misdemeanor charges. 155
For the 25 offenders with charges only, charges were dropped
or "nolle prossed' (not prosecuted) for 10 offenders. 56 Two
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Most of these offenders would have scored in the high-risk range on
the original Static-99R. Id. The lower Static-99R scores are likely the result of these
offenders being older at the time of evaluation, and the revised Static-99R being
better able to account for the age effect on risk (i.e., negative correlation of age
and recidivism rates). Id. Similarly, it is likely that recommended offenders
released from prison had higher Static-99R scores because they were younger at
release. Id.
151. Id. An additional offender had obtained a new charge for possession of
child pornography. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
52
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offenders had charges not filed, and 5 offenders were acquitted. 57
Charges are pending for 8 offenders.
15 8
Reoffenders (71) were somewhat younger on average (41.6 vs.
46.3) than the non-reoffenders in the group (699), and they had a
somewhat higher average score (5.7 vs. 5.0) on the Static-99R,
59
perhaps because of their younger age. However, because sample
sizes are so different, differences in age and score may not be as
pronounced as they appear, or as clinically meaningful.
9. Florida Rates for Recommended Offenders Comparable to Rates in
Other States
SVPP rates are similar to those found in other states for
offenders recommended for commitment but released instead of
committed. For a sample of Texas offenders where an evaluator
recommended commitment, 7.5% of unsupervised offenders had a
new sex-related charge or conviction. The rate was 0.8% for
supervised offenders (average release time: 4.77 years)."' In
California, 6.5% of offenders (6 out of 93) for whom two evaluators
157. Id.
158. Id. As noted, an additional 52 recommended offenders (for a grand total
of 762) were later identified from this time period, but their effect on rates has yet
to be (completely) calculated. Id. Of these additional offenders, 2 individuals were
found to have new sex-related charges or convictions. Id.
The Florida Office of Economic and Demographic Research (EDR) reviewed
a subset of offenders recommended for commitment but released (478) before
recidivism data were presented to a legislative subcommittee in January 2014.
Hearing Before the Healthy Families H. Subcomm., supra note 7. Like OPPAGA, EDR
provides policy research to the Florida Legislature. Id. Some of the 52 offenders
noted above may have been included, as well as some offenders released after the
follow-up period used for the SVPP study. Id. The reconviction rate found by EDR
is close to that found by SVPP and virtually identical to the OPPAGA rate for
offenders with settlement agreements: a total of 18 individuals were found to have
gone back to prison for new sex offenses (3.8% felony reconviction rate). Id. Eight
of these offenders (1.7% of the sample) reoffended within a year of release, 2
within two years (0.4%), and 1 within three years (0.2%). Id. Seven offenders
(1.5%) reoffended after three years in the community. Id.
159. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
160. Zavodny et al., supra note 7. Texas data are reported in Boccaccini et al.,
supra note 7, at 291. The unusually low rate for supervised offenders may be the
result of more offenders having intensive sex offender-specific probation (in
contrast to the kind of unstructured release with conditions common for Florida
offenders with settlement agreements). SeeZavodny et al., supra note 7.
161. Zavodny et al., supra note 7.
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had recommended commitment were found to have a new charge
1 62
or conviction (average release time: 4.7 years).
The State of Washington is an outlier for having a significantly
higher rate; of 135 offenders released who had been recommended
for commitment by at least one evaluator, 34 had a new sex-related
163charge or conviction within six years of release (25.2%). But even
here, a sample of offenders that experts thought to be too
dangerous to be in the community had a clear majority (75%)
giving no indication of having reoffended even after several years
of freedom.
10. Breakdown of SVPP Findings
The highest rates were associated with the group of offenders
recommended for commitment who were released at end-of-
sentence. The percentage of these offenders who obtained a new
conviction for a felony sex offense was 10.8%.'" The percentageI 65
with at least a new felony sex-related charge was 15.7%. " For any
sex char e, including dismissed misdemeanor charges, the rate was
16.9%."6 Again, these offenders had the longest period of time in
the community (ten or more years for many), the highest average
Static-99R score (5.3) and the youngest average age at release
(forty-two) .67 The number of offenders in this subset (83) is also
significantly smaller than for subsets of other offenders
recommended for commitment but released without being
committed.' 8
A total of 366 offenders fell into the category of offenders
recommended for commitment but granted full discharge by the
courts ("recommended but not committed," or RNC offenders). 169
The percentage of RNC offenders with a new felony sex offense
conviction after release was found to be 6.6%. 170 The rate was 8.7%
for RNC offenders with at least a new sex-related felony charge.'
71
162. Id.
163. Washington data are reported in MILLoY, supra note 7, at 3.
164. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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The rate was 10.7% for RNC offenders with any sex-related charge
at all (including offenders with acquittals or dropped charges,
felony or misdemeanor). 17
The detainee subset of the SVPP sample is of considerable size,
much larger than samples of offenders in other states who were
thought to meet commitment criteria but released without
commitment. It is useful for exploring the issue of possible rate
(risk) inflation in the predicted rates listed for the Static-99 line of
risk assessment instruments.
Most of these offenders were assessed years ago when the
Static-99 was being used. For offenders with Static-99 scores only,
Static-99R scores were calculated. The average Static-99R score for
RNC offenders is 5.1. As noted, compared to the original
instrument, the revised Static better accounts for the inverse
relationship between age and recidivism rate. Older offenders will,
therefore, earn somewhat lower scores on the 99R. Many, if not
most, RNC offenders assessed during the era of widespread use of
the Static were recommended for commitment based on scores of
6. Some offenders assessed in the very early years of the Act were
evaluated with other instruments, such as Rapid Risk Assessment
for Sex Offense Recidivism (RRASOR) or Sex Offender Risk
Appraisal Guide (SORAG).
Reconviction rates of 7%-9% are far below listed rates
(observed reconviction rates) for the Static-99. The lowest
reconviction rate listed for the original Static-99 for offenders withS 173
a score of 6 is 39% (for five years of release time). Even for a
score of 5, the reconviction rate is 33% for five-year follow up. 171 As
noted, these rates come from a sample of offenders released during
a period now decades past, when sexual offense and sexual
recidivism base rates were much higher than now.
Rates for RNC offenders are also well below even those listed
for the revised Static-99R. The Static-99R lists predicted rather than
observed rates per score.1 5 As noted earlier, offenders selected for
172. Id.
173. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 47, app. 6.
174. Id.
175. The developers used logistic regression analysis, which can be useful
when subsamples of offenders with higher scores are too small for meaningful
observation of rates by score. This issue and related issues with the Static are
discussed in Brian R. Abbott, Applicability of the New Static-99 Experience Tables in
Sexually Violent Predator Risk Assessments, SEXUAL-OFFENDER-TREATMENT.ORG (2009),
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full commitment evaluation, and especially offenders thought to
meet criteria after evaluation, are commonly thought by evaluators
to be most similar to the High Risk/Need Group for the 99R. Rates
per score for this group are the highest listed for any reference
176
group.
As with the OPPAGA findings, SVPP rates clearly indicate that
offenders recommended for commitment in Florida do not
resemble the offenders in the samples used by the instrument's
developers to obtain rates for the High Risk/Need Group. Most
RNC offenders were released more than five years ago; many have
been released ten or more years. Their average release time has not
yet been calculated but is likely to be six to seven years. Assuming a
conservative five-year follow-up period, offenders most similar to
those in the High Risk/Need Group with a score of 5 are predicted
to have 25.2% obtaining a new conviction or charge for sexual
offenses within this period. This is well above the observed 7%-9%
rate for RNC offenders. Even under the generous assumption that
the average 99R score would decrease by a full point if the score
depended on age at release from FCCC-reducing the average
from 5 to 4-the predicted rate for High Risk/Need Group
offenders with a score of 4 (20.1%) is still above the RNC observed
rate. The 95% confidence interval for this score is 17.4%-23.1%.
The low end of this interval is still well above what was found for
RNC offenders.
As with the OPPAGA sample, to the extent that any reference
group is similar, offenders in the Routine Group for the 99R-
average sex offenders-are the most similar to offenders in SVPP.
Rates listed for the Routine Group are the lowest for any reference
group on the Static-99R (only five-year rates). Even these may be
too high compared to SVPP rates. Offenders recommended for
commitment but released from prison appear to be the most
similar to the offenders in samples for norming the Routine Group.
For Routine Group offenders with a score of 5, the predicted
new conviction or new charge rate is 11.4% with a 95% confidence
interval of 8.2%-15.6%. For Routine Group offenders with a score
of 4, the predicted rate is 8.7% (confidence interval 6.1%-12.2%).
h ttp://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/ 1-200903.html.
176. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 47, at 5-8.
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The RNC rate falls within the confidence interval for offenders with
a score of 4 (only barely within the interval for a score of 5)."'
However, empirical reason exists to think that even Routine
Group norms are inflated. A recent analysis was conducted on 304
offenders from the SVPP sample who had been assessed with the
Static-99R. Using predicted rates for the High Risk/Needs Group,
86 of these 304 offenders would be expected to have become
detected sexual recidivists within five years of release (i.e.,
obtaining a new sex-related charge or conviction for sexual offenses
after release). Using predicted rates for the Preselected for
Treatment Needs Group, 56 of these offenders would be expected
to have become detected sexual recidivists within five years. Using
predicted rates for the Non-Routine Group, 68 detected sexual
recidivists would be expected.
7
Finally, using predicted rates for the Routine Group (which,
again, consists of average sex offenders released from prison and
corresponds with the lowest rates listed for the Static-99R), 41
detected sexual recidivists would be expected.17 9
For 304 offenders thought by experts to be atypical, especially
dangerous sex offenders, only 28 offenders (9% of the sample)
177. Although the rates listed on the actuarial tables for the Static-99R are
commonly interpreted as describing offenders with convictions or charges, an
argument can be made that the most accurate interpretation of 99R rates, given
the characteristics of the samples used to develop those tables, is rates of new
conviction. See Brian Abbott, Throwing the Baby Out With the Bath Water: Is It Time for
Clinical Judgment to Supplement Actuarial Risk Assessment?, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 222, 222-30 (2011). Dr. Abbott reports, from his examination of the samples,
that 60% of the recidivism estimates (predicted rates) listed on the actuarial tables
for the Static-99R are based on sex offense convictions as proxies for sexual
recidivism. The remaining 40% are based on charges. Id. at 224. If 99R rates are
interpreted as predicted rates of offenders obtaining either a new conviction or a
new charge, then the above noted group of offenders recommended for
commitment, with scores averaging about 5 would be similar to offenders in the
Routine Group with about the same score. If 99R rates are best interpreted as sex-
related reconviction rates then the above noted group of offenders is most similar
to Routine Group offenders with a score less than 5.
178. GREG DECLUE, A. K. RICE, MARKUS T. BOCCACCINI & DANIEL F. MONTALDI,
FLORIDA'S RELEASED "SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS" ARE NOT "HIGH RISK"
(forthcoming 2015). For contact information for the primary author, see
http://gregdeclue.myakkatech.com/. The Preselected for Treatment Needs
Group is the Static-99R reference group with the next highest predicted rates per
score. This reference group is based on samples of sex offenders either in
treatment or intended for treatment.
179. Id.
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were found to have obtained a new sex-related charge or conviction
within five years of release. is° This is 32% fewer detected sexual
recidivists than what would be expected for sex offenders if they in
fact resemble the offenders in the Routine Group samples used to
develop actuarial tables for the Static-99R."'8
As emphasized before, commitment-eligible offenders are not
supposed to be just any sex offender. Indeed, they are not just any
sex offender falling into a high-risk actuarial category. They are
supposed to be even more dangerous because they have a mental
condition so severe that it impairs their ability to resist acting on
sexual urges. These are supposed to be the "small but extremely
dangerous number"' 182 of violent predators that stand out from even
the "dangerous but typical recidivist[s]" who the United States
Supreme Court considers to be capable of ending their sexual
criminal pattern but who choose not to.18 ' The sexually violent
predator is considered to be even less capable of stopping (i.e., less
able to utilize volition or emotion based psychological resources to
respond to deterrence incentives and restrain sexual behavior that
is illegal) than the average violent criminal. This is because the
commitment-eligible sex offender supposedly experiences "serious
difficulty" controlling behavior-rendering him dangerous
"beyond control."'' 84 So it is reasonable to think that if released
offenders recommended for commitment were in fact as experts
had thought them to be (based on actuarial risk assessment with
the Static-99R and clinical evaluation of mental disorders), this
exceptionally dangerous group would have more sexual recidivists
than what would even be expected of a group of offenders with the
same Static-99R score.
In fact, a group of sex offenders considered so "out of control"
and dangerous that they were deemed to meet commitment
criteria and were recommended for commitment in Florida turned
out to have almost a third fewer sexual recidivists than what would
have been expected of typical sex offenders, according to the Static-
99R.
180. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
181. Id.
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255 (End) of the
2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Spec. "A" Sess. of the 23d Leg.).
183. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 407-08 (2002).
184. See supra text accompanying note 29 (discussing SVP-relevant mental
abnormality, impairment, and relevant Supreme Court opinions).
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This is confirmed by comparison to samples of typical sex
offenders across multiple states. SVPP prison releases, many of
whom have been released from ten to fourteen years, were all
deemed highly dangerous and recommended for commitment; yet,
185they were found to have only a 15.7% new felony sex charge rate.
The Adam Walsh rate for average Florida sex offenders released
from prison (average Static-99R score of 1.97) was 13.7% for
offenders released ten years. The prison rate is only somewhat
higher than the Adam Walsh rate for offenders, many released for
a longer period of time.'
The RNC rate (for recommended offenders released from
detainee status from civil confinement; six to seven years release
time) is three percentage points higher than the five-year rate for
the Adam Walsh offenders (8% vs. 5%). This might indicate
somewhat higher risk when taking into account that offenders in
the RNC group are an older group (RNC average age: forty-five;
Adam Walsh offenders, all states: thirty-seven). On the other
hand, the RNC group contains many offenders released over five
years, up to fourteen years. 18 Longer release time is associated with• 1 8 9
higher risk. The ten-year rate for Florida sex offenders in the
Adam Walsh study is six percentage points above the RNC rate
(14% vs. 8%). ' 90
11. Small Rate Differences Unlikely to Reflect Clinically Meaningful
Dfferences in Risk: A Summary of Results So Far
Small differences in recidivism percentages, when the
percentages compared are mostly 10% or less, mean that the
offender groups being compared are overwhelmingly made up of
individuals giving no indication of new sexual offenses. 9 '
185. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
186. ZGOBA ET AL., supra note 7, at 20.
187. The average age for offenders (across states) studied by the Adam Walsh
researchers is thirty-seven. No average age is reported for Florida offenders
specifically. See id. at 21. RNC offenders were older at release (average age forty-
five). SVPP Data, supra note 4.
188. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
189. Id.
190. Id.; See ZGOBA ET AL., Supra note 7, at 20.
191. Most offenders who reoffend do so within a few years of release,
especially offenders in higher risk categories. Most RNC offenders have been
released this long or more. See R. Karl Hanson et al., High-Risk Sex Offenders May
[Vol. 41:3
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Therefore, these small differences in recidivism percentages
suggest that the groups being compared are little different in risk-
related characteristics (clinically meaningful differences) even if
rate differences reach statistical significance.
Altogether, these comparisons provide support for the opinion
that, at least for sex offenders in Florida, even offenders considered
to be high risk are in fact most similar to, and may be at even lower
risk than, offenders in the Routine Group for the Static-99R."' No
justification exists for comparing offenders considered special with
respect to risk, or any other group of sex offenders released after
1999, to the High Risk/Needs Group. This argument is not simply
the claim that no empirically validated basis has ever existed for
choosing between reference groups, an important point made by
other authors.'9' It is the claim that now an empirical basis exists for
using the Routine Group, and not any other reference group, if the
Static-99R is used at all. And even the rates for the Routine Group
are inflated, at least for sex offenders in Florida.
Rates for the Routine Group do not approach 50%, or even
39% (for a follow-up period of five years) .' The only score coming
close is 9 (associated with a 37.2% predicted rate for five years). In
this author's experience, few if any sex offenders score this high.'
No empirical justification exists for using actuarial rates from the
Static as a primary basis for the opinion that an offender meets the
"likely" criterion for commitment, at least not in Florida.
At a higher level, these data give support for the claim that
offenders who were recommended for commitment in Florida
were, in fact, little different risk-wise from offenders not
recommended. Neither group was high risk when they were
evaluated for commitment consideration. That neither group was
high risk gives support to the claim that contemporary risk
Not Be High Risk Forever, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2792, 2805 (2014)
(concluding that the recidivism rate of released offenders was reduced by half for
every five-year period offenders remained offense-free while living in the
community).
192. See supra Part III.B.10.
193. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 110, at 104 ("It is simply unknown whether
risk factors external to the Static-99R even explain the differences in base rates
among the RC, PTN, and PHRN reference groups.").
194. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
195. See PHENIX ET AL., supra note 47, at 5-8, for actuarial tables with rates for
the Routine Group and other reference groups.
196. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
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assessment and clinical evaluation methods are not capable of
distinguishing commitment-eligible sex offenders from average sex
offenders with respect to SVP commitment criteria as they are now
formulated (at least not in Florida). Given no reason to think that
Florida sex offenders are, in general, significantly different from
sex offenders anywhere else in the United States, this claim is likely
to a ly in all states with sex offender-specific civil commitment
laws.
12. A Message to Minnesota: Comparing Full Confinement to
Conditional Release-Inpatient Versus Outpatient Treatment
Of particular relevance to commitment programs like
Minnesota's that are considering how to expand Less Restrictive
Alternative programming is the comparison of offenders
recommended for commitment but granted conditional release to
offenders once committed but later released as no longer meeting
criteria for commitment. In Florida, offenders with settlement
agreements are required to attend outpatient sex offender
treatment in the community at their expense."' Formerly
committed offenders have usually participated in years of intensive
inpatient treatment programming at the state's expense.199
If the offenders recommended for civil confinement rather
than (any form of) release are really too dangerous for even
197. See generally John L. Schwab, Due Process and the "Worst of the Worst": Mental
Competence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 112 COLUM. L.
REv. 912, 916 n.31 (2012) (citing Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment
Programs: Current Practices, Characteristics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 439, 441 (2008)) ("Those states are Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin.").
198. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.928 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255 (End) of
the 2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Spec. "A" Sess. of the 23d Leg.) ("In recognition of the
fact that persons committed under this part may have sources of income ... each
person so committed shall . . . pay from such income and assets, except where
such income is exempt by state or federal law, all or a fair portion of the person's
daily subsistence and treatment costs, based upon the person's ability to pay, the
liability or potential liability of the person to the victim or the guardian or the
estate of the victim, and the needs of his or her dependents.").
199. See id. § 394.929 (Westlaw) ("The Department of Children and Families is
responsible for all costs relating to the evaluation and treatment of persons
committed to the department's custody as sexually violent predators.").
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intensive community management, then conditional release should
fail as a sexual crime control measure. The recidivism rate for
offenders recommended for commitment but released pursuant to
200settlement agreements would be high. If intensive inpatient
treatment in a secure facility were in fact the only possible effective
treatment intervention for offenders recommended for
commitment, then offenders with years of inpatient treatment
201would show much less sexual recidivism.
Rates were indeed low for formerly committed offenders. SVPP
found a felony sex offense reconviction rate of 3% for a group of
100 offenders that had been recommended and committed but
later released by the courts as no longer meeting commitment
2criteria (the NLM group).2 If offenders with felony charges were
included, this percentage increased to 4% (NLM offenders). 211 If
NLM offenders with any sex-related charge after release were
21
included, the rate was 7%.
Almost identical rates were found for offenders with
settlement agreements. A 3.1% felony sex reconviction rate was
found for a group of 161 offenders with conditional release per
205agreement (the settlement agreement group or SA group). When
SA offenders who obtained a new felony charge were included, the
206
rate was 6.8%. The rate remained the same when all offenders
207
with any sex charge were included.
Risk-wise, formerly committed offenders, after years of
inpatient treatment in a secure facility, appear to be about the
same at time of release as offenders recommended for
commitment but granted release on the condition that they attend
outpatient treatment.2" This finding is especially surprising given
that offenders with settlement agreements included a greater
percentage of offenders released for many years (45% SA offenders
vs. 27% NLM offenders released five or more years) and they
were somewhat younger at time of release (forty-six for SA vs.
200. Cf SVPP Data, supra note 4.
201. Cf id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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fifty for NLM). 2° The SA group also contained proportionally
more offenders with high actuarial scores (average 99R score for
SA = 5.0, NLM = 4.5).210
These data give strong suggestion that if there is any difference
in treatment, outpatient treatment might be superior. Certainly it is
less expensive for taxpayers. At this point, no evidence shows that
state expenditure on inpatient treatment in a secure civil facility is
achieving its intended purpose.
13. Treatment Shows No Clear Effect at All
Even more importantly, neither inpatient nor outpatient
treatment appears to have had much, if any, effect in reducing
recidivism when NLM offenders and SA offenders are compared to
the released detainees (no treatment). As noted, of the 366
discharged detainees in the group, 6.6% of offenders obtained new
felony convictions and 8.7% obtained felony charges. 2 1 These rates
are only a few percentage points above NLM and SA rates, even
though the detainee offender group has, on average, spent more
time in the community (66% of the detainees were released over
five years) .212
Some might interpret this difference in rates (6.6% vs. 3% for
offenders with new convictions; 8.7% vs. 4% for offenders with new
felony charges) 21 as supporting the claim that inpatient treatment
reduced the rate in half, compared to no treatment. Given that
experts determined that both groups of offenders met
commitment criteria based on the same risk assessment and
diagnostic methods, these groups should have been approximately
similar in risk at time of transfer to FCCC.214 If the rate for
offenders released after treatment is half the rate of offenders
released without treatment, it might appear that treatment had an
effect.
However, given the longer time since release, younger age,
and higher actuarial scores, detainees would be expected to have a
higher rate anyway. With rate differences so small, and the rates of
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id.
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both groups already well below 10%, it is reasonable to think that
when formerly committed offenders have been in the community
as long as detainees now have, the difference between the rate at
that time and the current rate of detainees will be even smaller, if
not absent.215
When discharged detainees are compared to offenders on
conditional release, the difference in rates for offenders obtaining
any sex charge is very small (within two percentage points).
Offenders with settlement agreements have been released longer
than formerly committed offenders, and those offenders were
somewhat younger at release (albeit not as long, and not as young,
as detainees).217 The point above applies here as well.
At this point in time, no form of treatment-inpatient or
outpatient-shows a clearly measurable effect in reducing risk for
offenders recommended for commitment in Florida. However, a
lack of efficacy does not mean that treatment programming has
been poorly designed or administered. It seems more likely that
rates for untreated offenders, even those thought by experts to be
especially high risk, are already so low that no intervention short of
physical incapacitation can reduce rates further, at least not
significantly. A kind of statistical "floor" effect in sexual recidivism
may be occurring.
Released offenders recommended for commitment (based on
full evaluation) can also be compared to offenders evaluated but
not recommended. As noted, data are still being gathered for the
second group (which is large, more than 1200). But felony sex
offense reconviction rates are known. Offenders selected for full
evaluation typically have more than one sex offense-related
conviction in their history, as opposed to the average offender not• 1- 211
recommended for commitment, as discussed earlier. Static
(99/99R) data for this group have yet to be gathered, and the
average age at release is not yet known. However, it can be said that
this specific group of offenders would have a higher average
actuarial score than most sex offenders referred for commitment
215. The rate for formerly committed offenders might even exceed the SA
rate by this point.
216. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
217. Id.
218. See supra Part III.B.9.
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consideration, although (often) not as high as offenders
recommended for commitment.2' 9
The felony sex offense reconviction rate for offenders who
received full evaluation but who were not recommended for
commitment was 3% for those released between five and ten years'220
ago. The rate was 4% for evaluated offenders released over ten221
years. The rates are little different than rates for groups of
recommended offenders, or rates for offenders referred for
commitment consideration but not recommended, considered as a
whole (2%-4%).222
This minute difference is further indication that experts
applying nationally recognized best practices in risk assessment and
clinical evaluation for diagnoses were not able to "narrow the field"
to a significantly higher risk group. 22' Despite experts' best efforts
to be selective, a group of offenders distinguished as being in need
of evaluation and a final group assessed to be the most dangerous,
differ only somewhat (within a few percentage points) from sex
offenders left undifferentiated (after vast differences in sample
sizes are taken into account, e.g., 30,000 vs. 1200 vs. 366). With
regard to the risk-related characteristics of representative offenders
in each group, such differences are unlikely to be clinically
meaningful: the overwhelming majority of offenders in all groups give no
indication of continued sexual offending.
Very serious problems exist in evaluation methods and
technologies when sexual recidivism rates for offenders determined
to be "likely" to continue sexual violence if released differ only
slightly from offenders determined to not meet this standard.
14. Other SVPP Findings
At this point, there appears to be no discernible risk-reducing
effect coming from progressing in treatment or completing it. For
those committed offenders eventually discharged who had reached
an advanced stage of inpatient treatment (thirty-nine Phase IV
219. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. This latter group includes all offenders referred and reviewed by SVPP,
but not selected for evaluation (which results in no recommendation for
commitment), as well as offenders reviewed and evaluated but not recommended
when the multidisciplinary team gave these cases a final review.
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offenders), two individuals (2.6%) obtained new sex-related felony
224charges. Both individuals had been determined to have achieved
maximum therapeutic benefit prior to discharge (two out of
sixteen, or 12.5%). Samples are small and need to be larger before
generalizations become conclusive. But at least so far, no effect is
yet detectible.
The SVPP data suggest that the inverse association between
age and recidivism rates-the age effect-is yet to be adequately
accounted for, even with the revision of actuarial instruments.
Differences between age groups for offenders in the SVPP sample
are striking. For offenders in the eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old
group when recommended for commitment (seventy-five), two
offenders (2%) obtained new charges for rape. One of these
offenders was convicted (1.3%). No offender in this group
obtained a new charge for a child-related offense. It should be kept
in mind that relatively few young adult offenders will have sufficient
sexual criminal history to be recommended for commitment. Rates
increase for older offenders up to age forty-nine (most offenders
recommended for commitment are in their forties). For offenders
thirty to thirty-nine years old when recommended (147), twelve
offenders obtained new charges for rape (8%), with ten of those
convicted (7%). Of the five offenders who obtained new charges
for a child contact offense (3%), three were convicted (2%). For
offenders forty to forty-nine years old (245), eleven obtained a new
charge for rape (4%), with eight convicted (3%).
Despite generally low rates for recommended offenders in
general, rates are even lower for offenders who were older than
fifty at the time of recommendation, especially with regard to new
offenses of physical violence. For offenders age fifty to fifty-nine
when evaluated (149), only one (< 1%) obtained a new charge for
rape (no convictions). Four individuals obtained a new child
contact related charge with all four (3%) convicted.
The most dramatic difference comes from offenders who were
age sixty or older at time of recommendation (ninety-three). Out
of this group, no one obtained a new charge or conviction for either
rape or child molestation (0%).225 Static scores per age group have
224. SVPP Data, supra note 4. All reported data in this section of this Article
come from SVPP Data, id., and individual footnotes are omitted.
225. Only one offender older than sixty obtained a new sex-related charge.
The offender had a dropped misdemeanor charge for unwanted sexual touch of
the upper body of a girlfriend, age sixty or older. His diagnosis was pedophilia. Id.
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yet to be calculated. But given these offenders were thought to
meet commitment criteria, most offenders, including offenders
who were age sixty or older when evaluated, would have had high
or high-moderate range scores.
SVPP has investigated each new sexual offense committed by
offenders recommended for commitment and later released. This
investigation uncovered some additional unexpected facts. For
example, the percentage of offenders having new offenses against a
stranger, a victim profile commonly associated with predators, is
very low. The percentage of offenders using a high degree of
physical violence, another predator trait (at least for rapists), is also
very low.
A total of forty out of seventy-one offenders with new charges
or convictions were charged with an offense against an adult or
teenage victim. Of these, thirty-three offenders had contact-related
charges. Of the seventy-one total offenders, sixteen had charges or
convictions for rape or attempted rape against a stranger victim
(2.3% of the 710 total offenders). Twelve of these individuals
engaged in physical violence and four additional offenders
threatened violence (2.2%). Five victims were teenagers age fifteen
to seventeen. The average age of reoffenders was forty-two.
Ten offenders had rape-related charges or convictions against
known victims. Nine offenders used physical violence and one
offender threatened violence. Four were engaged in domestic
violence at the time. Two victims were teenagers. The average age
of reoffenders was forty-two. The victims of two reoffenders were
murdered (one stranger victim and one known victim), which is
0.3% of the sample. No other description of these reoffenders is yet
available.
A total of 26 out of 710 offenders (3.7%) had charges or
convictions related to child molestation. Twenty of these offenders
had contact offenses. Eight offenders engaged in penetration of
the victim (1.1% of the 710). Four offenders had a child victim who
was a stranger (0.6%). This is remarkable given that sex offenders
with SVP status are commonly thought to be predators against
strangers. One offense involved possible physical violence. The
average age of these offenders was 47.5.
Some findings were more expected. Offenders with new
charges or convictions (seventy-one) were somewhat younger on
average than the non-reoffenders (699) in the group (average age
of 41.6 vs. 46.3). Offenders with new charges or convictions also
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had a somewhat higher average score on the Static-99R (5.7 vs.
5.0), but probably due to younger age. Because sample sizes are so
different, differences in age and score may not be as pronounced
as they appear.
IV. POLICY EFFICACY
By statute, the long-term study that DCF is required to conduct
is intended to assess the overall efficacy of the provisions of the SVP
Act.
226 Many elements are involved in a full study and more work
needs to be done on just the recidivism portion. However, some
preliminary conclusions are possible. Data now exist for estimating
the likely impact civil commitment has had on sexual crime in
Florida. These data open a window into issues of cost effectiveness.
A. The Effect of Commitment on Statewide Sexual Crime Rates
As noted earlier, it seems reasonable to assume that lawmakers
did not expect any significant number of persons found to meet
commitment criteria to ever be released for no longer meeting
criteria."' Nor did they probably expect that any significant
number of persons recommended for commitment by SVPP would• -228
not be taken to trial and committed. So lawmakers probably did
not intend a study of the efficacy of the Act to be an examination of
recidivism by persons subject to the Act. They probably intended
the study to be, among other things, an examination of the impact
of commitment on statewide sexual crime rates. If commitment has
had a significant effect in preventing sexual offenses, then it seems
226. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.931 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255 (End) of the
2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Sp. "A" Sess. of the 23d Leg.).
227. Id. § 394.910 (Westlaw) ("The Legislature further finds that the
prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a prison setting is poor,
the treatment needs of this population are very long term, and the treatment
modalities for this population are very different from the traditional treatment
modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the Baker Act. It is
therefore the intent of the Legislature to create a civil commitment procedure for
the long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators."); see supra text
accompanying notes 29-33.
228. Id. § 394.911 (Westlaw) ("The Legislature intends that persons who are
subject to the civil commitment procedure for sexually violent predators under
this part be subject to the procedures established in this part and not to the
provisions of part I of this chapter.").
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reasonable to expect a measurable decrease in statewide sexual
crime rates that can be tied to commitment.
A decrease in sexual offending and reoffending has indeed
occurred in Florida and nationwide.22" However, no evidence
suggests the decrease is the result of sex offender-specific civil
commitment. As will be discussed in a moment, this decrease
results from the exceeding of the rate of decline (i.e., the rate at
which annual rates of reported sexual crime declined) for any six-
year period subsequent to the Act by that of the six years prior to
the Act. Whatever effect civil commitment has had on preventing
sexual crime, it is much smaller than lawmakers likely expected.
2
In fact, the effect is too small to have had any empirically
measurable effect on statewide sex crime rates or totals. The
following data tell the story.
First, some general background: the number of reported sex
crimes in Florida was highest for the year 1993. 23 That year, 13,752
232sex offenses were reported to authorities. The number of
233reported sex crimes was at its lowest for the year 2013 (9863).
The total combined number of rapes and attempted rapes showed
a small decrease from 2011, with a total of 5273, to 2012, when the
total was 5254.21 The year 2012 showed the lowest recorded total
for rape-related crimes.235
The magnitude of this decrease can be appreciated by looking
at annual rates (i.e., the number of reported crimes per unit of
resident population). By 2013, the rate of reported forcible sex
offenses was at a historic low with 51.2 reported sex offenses per• 236
100,000 Florida residents. This is approximately half the 1993
rate (101.1).237
229. 1971-2013 REPORTED SEX OFFENSES, supra note 6; Over 60 Percent Decline in
Sexual Violence Against Females from 1995 to 2010, BUREAUJUST. STAT. (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/fvsv9410pr.cfm.
230. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (Westlaw) ("The Legislature further finds
that the likelihood of sexually violent predators engaging in repeat acts of
predatory sexual violence is high.").
231. 1971-2013 REPORTED SEX OFFENSES, supra note 6.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. The rape-related number increased in 2013 because the FBI
changed its definition of rape, resulting in 6740 reported offenses. See id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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By 2012, the sum total of reported rapes and attempted rapes
was at a historic low (5254), which also had the lowest rate of
reported rapes and attempted rapes (27.5 per 100,000 residents),
2 "8
compared to a historic high in 1980 (56.7).29 The 1992-93 rates
were almost as high (54.2, and 53.4, respectively) .21' Again, because
of the change in definition for rape, it is difficult to compare 2013
data to previous years. 21 For all years in which reported sex crime
totals are recorded (1989-2013), the total exceeds 10,000 except
for 2010, 2011, and 2013 (9885, 9880, and 9863, respectively).
Given that sexual crime had already been on the decline years
before sex offender civil commitment was established in Florida, if
commitment has had a significant impact on reducing sexual
crime, then it should at least roughly coincide with, or precede,
greater decline. However, no such coinciding happened. Over the
first six years before the Act (1993-99) the rate declined from 101
to 82.1, a decrease of 19 reported sex crimes per 100,000
143residents. Rates continued to decline through the first years of
the Act (1999-2005) but the magnitude of decline decreased.2 4
Reported sexual crimes decreased from 82.1 in 1999 to 68.3 in
2005,245 a cumulative decrease of 13.8 reported crimes per 100,000
residents. There was a greater decrease from 2005 to 2011 (15.6
246reported crimes for every 100,000 residents). Nonetheless, the
decrease from 2005 to 2011 still represents that fewer crimes-
though not by far-were reported than during the six years before• -241
any sex offender was committed.
Whatever effect commitment has had on preventing sexual
recidivism that would have otherwise occurred, such an effect is too
248small to show up in rate trends. SVPP data show why the impact
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 2013 FLA. CRIME REPORT, supra note 6; FLA. DEP'T OF LAw ENFORCEMENT,
CRIME IN FLORIDA: JANuARY-DECEMBER 2010 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 FLA. CRIME
REPORT]; FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA: JANUARY-DECEMBER
2011 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 FLA. CRIME REPORT].
243. 1971-2013 Reported Sex Offenses, supra note 6, at 1.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. To the point that reported sex crime data do not (by definition) indicate
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of civil commitment on statewide sexual offenses is so small. These
data allow an empirically based estimation of the number of sex
offenses prevented by commitment.
Since inception of the Act, a total of 67 out of 610 offenders
recommended for commitment but not committed obtained at
least one new sex-related charge (including dropped charges and
misdemeanor charges), 9  which represents an 11% sexual
recidivism rate.210 These are offenses not prevented even with a
commitment law. However, these offenses give some idea of how
many offenses have been prevented by civilly confining offenders
who are still confined.
As of January 2014, a total of 647 individuals were civilly
confined at or near the end of the SVPP study (567 committed) .
These individuals were assessed and recommended by experts
using the exact same risk assessment and clinical evaluation
methods used for recommended persons later released. As
discussed earlier, no systemic reason exists for believing that
offenders currently in civil confinement constitute a significantly
higher risk group at the time they were assessed than other
offenders recommended for confinement. Cases going forward to
trial and successful commitment may have had more plentiful
evidence (and available witnesses) than those that did not. But,
SVPP considered the evidence sufficient for all cases where it
recommended filing a commitment petition. More evidence in
support of a conclusion about risk is not, just as such, evidence of
more risk. So while it is possible that the offenders currently in civil
confinement were (or are) more dangerous, no clear basis exists,
empirical or logical, to treat this possibility as a probability.
anything specific about unreported crime, the same could be said of 1993 data as
is said about current data. As noted earlier, no evidence supports the claim that
unreported sexual crime has increased or that the public is less inclined to report
sexual crime now than twenty or more years ago. In fact, evidence across domains
makes the opposite much more likely. See generally Finkelhor & Jones, supra note
64.
249. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
250. See id.
251. For FCCC census and SVPP budget data, see generally COMM. ON
APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 7, at 6; COMM. ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND ELDER
AEAiRs, supra note 8; and THE PROF'L STAFF OF THE COMM. ONJUDIcIARY, THE FLA.
SENATE, BILL ANALYSIS & FiscAL IMPACT STATEMENT, S. 522, 2014 Reg. Sess., at 12
(2014) [hereinafter COMM. ONJUDICIARY], available at http://static.lobbytools.com
/bills/2014/pdf/AS05221484.pdf.
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It is therefore reasonable to use the sexual recidivism rate of
the released group of offenders recommended for commitment
(11%) as an estimate of what the rate would be had all
recommended offenders been released. Applying this rate to the
647 still confined offenders, approximately 71 more offenders
would be expected to have had a new sex-related charge or
conviction (0.11 x 647). Adding these to the 71 reoffenders in the
710 offenders in the sample yields a total of 142 offenders either
reoffending or expected to have reoffended had no one been
committed.
Finally, a total of 100 offenders in the SVPP study were
committed and later released by the courts as no longer meeting• . 252
criteria. A total of 4 individuals from this group have obtained a
new sex charge. 53 These were also offenses not prevented even with
commitment. The 11% figure is a reasonable indication of what
would have happened had these offenders never been committed.
This would be 11 individuals, or 7 more than the 4 already
observed. Adding this 7 to the 142 above results in a grand total of
149 offenders who either reoffended or would have reoffended had
no one been committed.
Of course some offenses are never detected, or they are
reported to authorities but do not result in an arrest or charge.
Additionally, even detained offenders spent some time in a secure
civil facility not otherwise spent in the community, time that could
have resulted in some unknown number of additional offenses.
Empirically, there is no way to be precise about estimates of
unobserved new offenses prevented by commitment.
To provide a margin of error, we might assume that still
confined and formerly committed offenders would have had, on
average, five times as many new offenses as they would have had
new arrests (had they not been committed). This is an assumption,
and a generous one. It has no apparent empirical basis. It is also
reasonable to assume for the moment that all of these offenses
would have been reported, and just not resulted in arrests. This
assumption allows comparison to reported crime totals. Such a
comparison makes a total of 745 offenses prevented (5 new
offenses per person for 149 offenders). Further, this computation
allows for the possibility that some offenders would have been
252. SVPP Data, supra note 4.
253. Id.
72
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
prolific had they not been committed, having considerably more
new offenses; whereas other offenders would have had no new
254offenses that did not result in a new conviction or arrest.
The SVP Act has been in effect fourteen years. 25' A total of 745
prevented offenses amounts to 53 sex offenses prevented for each
year of the Act. In 2013 the total number of reported forcible sex
crimes in Florida was 9863.256 The highest total (13,752) was seen in
1993.257 Without the Act, the number of reported sex crimes in
2013 was estimated to have been 9916 if there had been no
commitment (9863 + 53 prevented offenses). The number of
prevented offenses was 0.53% of what the total would have been
that year without commitment (53 / 9916 x 100 = 0.53). Using the
total for 1993, this percentage would be slightly less (53 / 13,752
x 100 = 0.39). These are very small percentages.
Another way to estimate the number of sex offenses prevented
is to take the highest observed rate of offenders obtaining new sex-
related charges. The group of 83 offenders recommended for
commitment but released from prison (because petitions were not
filed) displayed the highest rate of any subset of sex offenders SVPP
examined. This group had 16.9% of its members eventually
obtaining any new sex-related charge.259
Applying this rate to the entire group of offenders
recommended for commitment but either released without
commitment (610), 26 released after commitment (100), 261 or still
262confined (647), yields a total of 229 offenders who would have
sexually reoffended had no one been committed (1357 x 16.9%
= 229). Assume that these offenders would have had an average of 5
254. For further discussion of this issue, see Abel et al., supra note 66, at 3-25.
The misperception that sex offenders have high recidivism rates and other myths
are discussed in Richards, supra note 65.
255. Act approved May 26, 1999, ch. 99-222, §§ 394.910-930, 1999 Fla. Laws
1372 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910-.932 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 255 (End) of the 2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Sp. "A" Sess. of the 23d
Leg.)).
256. See 1971-2013 REPORTED SEX OFFENSES, supra note 6, at 2.
257. Id. at 1.
258. See SVPP Data supra note 4.
259. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
262. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 7, at 6.
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new offenses, for a total of 1145 offenses prevented. This is 82
prevented offenses per year for fourteen years.
Using the 2013 total mentioned above (9863), if these offenses
had been reported, this means there would have been 9945
reported offenses without the Act (9863 + 82). The number of
prevented offenses (potentially reported) is 0.8% of what the total
number of reported sex offenses would have been, using the 2013
total (82 / 9945 x 100 = 0.8). It is about 0.6% using the 1993 total
(13,752 + 82 = 13,834; 82 / 13,834 x 100 = 0.6). Again, the
percentages are very small.
Based on these estimates, commitment has prevented less than
1 % of all reported sex offending that would have otherwise
occurred. A percentage this small would seem to account for why
there is no discernible effect of sex offender civil commitment on
statewide sex crime rates.
There is no way to know the annual number of all sex offenses
in Florida, both reported and unreported. It would be a higher
figure than the number of reported offenses. Multiplying by five,2 6'
the number of expected reoffenders provides an estimate of total
number of prevented offenses, reported or not. Using an annual
figure for all sex offenses that is higher than the annual number of
reported offenses means that the annual number of prevented
offenses would be an even smaller percentage of the yearly total.
B. Is Sex Offender Civil Commitment Worth the Cost?
It is difficult to estimate the cost to Florida of all SVP-related
commitment processes. State budget figures for the SVP program
do not include the expense of trials and evaluators hired directly by
ASAs and defense counsel.2C Costs can be in the tens of thousands
of dollars per trial (and annual review evaluations and hearingst 2165
thereafter). Program expenses varied considerably over the years,
increasing to $30.9 million byJanuary 2013.266
263. See supra Part IV.A.
264. See COMM. ONJUDICIARY, supra note 251, at 12-13 (stating that the budget
valuation was based on the cost to house and evaluate sexually violent predators).
265. See id. at 12-13, 15 (indicating that the judicial costs are: $250,000
annually for ajudge; $1486 to prosecute each case; $8566 to defend each case; and
$4765 for witnesses, depositions, and transcripts).
266. See id. at 13.
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It is reasonable to use $31 million as an estimated annual cost.
Program budgets were lower in the early years of the Act but this
figure does not include judicial and circuit/county trial costs. It is aS 267
reasonably conservative overall estimate. This yields a grand total
estimate for fourteen years of $434 million for sex offender-
specific civil commitment since 1999 through January 2013.
The $434 million figure means that $2,912,752 was spent for
each one of the 149 potential sex offenses that commitment
prevented (i.e., offenses that would have obtained at least a new
charge had they happened), or $582,550 per prevented offense if
we assume 745 prevented offenses, or $379,039 per prevented
268offenses if we assume 1145 prevented offenses.
This is considerable expense per prevented offense, especially
in light of the fact that this money could have been spent on
expanding criminal justice management structures, affecting a
vastly larger number of sex offenders. Commitment affects
hundreds at most. Sex offender-specific probation can potentially
affect tens of thousands. Most reoffenders come from the huge
group of average sex offenders. There is no obvious reason why the
number of offenses prevented by commitment is larger than the
number that could have been prevented by expanding probation-
related resources (and prison-based treatment programming). It
may well have been fewer. Many more offenders would have been
affected, at a vastly lower cost per offender.
No doubt the reader has heard it said, "Sparing one child (or
adult victim) is worth any expense." Preventing people from
suffering terrible crimes is certainly worth public expense and a
significant investment by the taxpayer. Most citizens are willing to
bear a serious tax burden for crime control, especially for the
control of sexual crime. But, if it is true that sparing a sexual victim
is worth any expense then, logically, it would apply to each and
267. Cost in Florida is low for SVP programs. This author does not have up-to-
date costs for other states; however, a comparison of state costs completed by the
Washington State Institute for Public Policy indicated that costs in 2006 were
reported as $41,845 in Florida and $141,255 in Minnesota. WASH. STATE INST. FOR
PUB. POLICY, COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, REVISED 5 (2007). The average
across state SVP programs is reported to be $97,000 in 2006. Id. at 1. Average
annual SVP program cost is reported to be $40.5 million. Id.
268. For other states, cost per prevented offense is likely to be much higher
because of higher spending on civil commitment. See supra note 267 (referring to
other states' costs for SVP programs).
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every one of 9863 reported sexual crimes in 2013, or 13,752 in
1993, if these crimes could have been prevented. Using the low
estimate of cost per prevented sex offense, this would mean a total
of $6,066,666,666 for 2013, or $8,444,209,320 in 1993.2" This is just
for the control of sexual crime, not the vast array of non-sexual
crimes, including other kinds of violent crime. For those sincere in
making such claims, expressions of concern and indignation
should be paired with brutal honesty about cost and equally
passionate calls for greatly increased taxation and diversion of
public resources from other social goods. Such calls have not been
forthcoming.
V. CONCLUSIONS
More research and analysis are needed. This Article is only a
first step toward a comprehensive policy analysis of an SVP
commitment law and program in a large state. However, findings
from the OPPAGA27 and SVPP27 1 studies, together with state crime
data, offer support for a number of claims about SVP commitment
and related processes. While these claims certainly call for further
investigation and replication, they are consistent with available data
and can be made with reasonable confidence.
A. Conclusions About Eligibility Determinations
Mental health experts in a large state, applying nationally
accepted best practices in risk assessment and clinical evaluation,
have been largely successful in identifying and recommending for
commitment those sex offenders referred for commitment
consideration who met commitment criteria. The data suggest
strongly that compared to the more than 31,000 sex offenders
reviewed by SVPP since 1999, there were relatively few cases of
offenders not recommended for commitment where sufficient
evidence may have existed to allow reasonable certainty that the
offender did in fact meet criteria. Contrary to media claims that theS 272
commitment process in Florida is broken, a realistic policy
analysis supports the opposite conclusion: the sexual recidivism
269. See 1971-2013 REPORTED SEX OFFENSES, supra note 6.
270. See supra Part III.B.3.
271. See supra Part III.B.8.
272. See Kestin & Williams, supra note 2.
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rate for sex offenders determined not to meet criteria in Florida
and not recommended for commitment is in fact very low (2%-
4%) 2" and comparable to, if not lower than, rates for non-
recommended sex offenders in other states, including Minnesota,
271which may have the nation's most inclusive commitment process.
Commitment criteria were written to apply to only a "small but
extremely dangerous number" of predatory sex offenders.27 5 This
means that criteria will, at most, apply to only a minority of all sex
offenders approaching end-of-sentence. This leaves tens of
thousands of sex offenders who will not meet criteria (30,000+ in
Florida). It is not realistic to expect that the sexual recidivism rate
will be zero if so many sex offenders are released from prison. As it
is, a 2%-4% rate for this huge group is probably as low as current
risk assessment and clinical evaluation methods allow.
No doubt there have been at least some offenders who had
limited sexual criminal history, not enough for SVPP to assign a
paraphilia diagnosis and high actuarial score, but who did meet
commitment criteria by virtue of having a disorder so impairing to
their capacity for self-control that they were indeed made
dangerous beyond control. 276 These offenders may have been near
the beginning of a predatory career. However, mental health
professionals would not have known this, given limited
documented background for these offenders. Dangerous offenders
are rarely self-disclosing. Even if one assumes that all such
offenders had one prior physically violent sexual crime, many
offenders with similarly limited histories do not have another
documented sex offense. To this author's knowledge, no method
currently exists that permits the identification of the minority of
sex offenders who will reoffend who have a prior physically violent
sex offense from the majority with the same record who will not
have another known sex offense.27' These facts, combined with thefact that non-recommended offenders as a group produced a very
273. See supra Part I.D.
274. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
275. F _. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255 (End) of the
2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Sp. "A" Sess. of the 23d Leg.).
276. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-12 (2002) (holding that for civil
commitment there must be a lack of control determination but it does not need to
be an absolute or complete lack of control).
277. This minority is tiny for offenders who murder.
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low sexual recidivism rate, suggest that few offenders who met
criteria despite limited history were missed.
Also to be considered is a claim that no media outlet or
politician seems likely to emphasize given public opinion about sex
offenders. It is a claim that civil libertarians would emphasize, as
well as advocates of government power limited by individual rights.
In contrast to a good record of identifying sex offenders in
need of commitment, conscientious and dedicated mental health
experts in Florida, using nationally accepted best practices in risk
assessment and clinical evaluation, did far less well in limiting
recommendations to just those sex offenders who genuinely met
criteria for SVP civil commitment.278 In fact, experts had virtually no
success at all in distinguishing a group of especially dangerous and271
disordered sex offenders from typical sex offenders. Sexual
recidivism rates for offenders deemed to be special were in fact
little different than rates for offenders thought not to be special. 280
For every offender appropriately recommended for commitment,
multiple offenders were recommended unnecessarily.
B. Risk Assessment Methodology
This gross disproportion of unnecessary versus justified
recommendations suggests some conclusions about the specific
methods used in Florida since 1999, which probably were (and
likely still are) largely the same methods used by experts in all
states with SVP laws. Actuarial risk assessment with the Static-99 and
-99R, even when integrated with other risk-related considerations,
did not enable experts to isolate a group of offenders "likely" to
continue sexual offending if not confined on any plausible
interpretation of "likely.''212 Actual observed rates for recently
studied sex offenders in Florida, released since 1999 are far below
the listed observed rates for the Static-99 as well as the predicted
rates for the Static-99R. Actuarial rates for the Static are
significantly inflated for Florida sex offenders and are not an
accurate gauge of absolute risk with respect to offenders obtaining
278. See SVPP Data, supra note 4.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra Part III.B.4.
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new sex-related charges or convictions after release. Given no
reason to think that Florida sex offenders are much different from
sex offenders in other states, or that Florida laws and restrictions
throughout the past fourteen years were much different from what
was becoming a trend in many states (Florida may now be among
the most restrictive), the Static pair of instruments (99 and 99R) is
not likely to be useful for measuring absolute risk for sex offenders
anywhere in the United States. 285 Their findings (actuarial category
placement and identification of an associated recidivism rate) have
no direct bearing on whether or not someone meets the "likely"
standard.
With sexual recidivism rates as low as they are for sex offenders
in Florida, even for offenders deemed special, it is not likely that
any actuarial instrument currently available can be used as a valid
gauge of absolute risk. No instrument of which the author is aware
has a score category associated with even one sample of sex
offenders released well into the nationwide decline in sexual
offense/recidivism base rates (since 1993 but especially since 1999)
showing an observed sexual recidivism rate anywhere close to 50%. 28
As most offenders who reoffend do so within a few years of
release,"' if rates for these offenders are not already 30%-40%,
they are not likely to go up much further. Certainly no sample of
Florida sex offenders released since 1999 is showing a rate this
high, not by far. The data suggest that the future lies with designing
new instruments, not with revising actuarial tables for current
instruments to reflect "local norms."
2
88
284. See supra Part III.B.4.
285. In other states the Static-99R may function better as a relative rank order
device (relative risk). In Florida, the instrument is problematic even as a gauge of
relative risk.
286. This is assuming it is correct to interpret group rates from samples of
offenders released many years ago as having probabilistic significance for
individual cases and gauging potential for new offenses throughout many future
years. Reasons exist to reject this assumption. See Montaldi, Philosophy of SVP, supra
note 29, at 4-21 to -30.
287. Hanson et al., supra note 191.
288. This is assuming that actuarial approaches to risk assessment in general,
or specifically for purposes of SVP determinations, have a future.
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C. The Current Dilemma of History-Based Risk Assessment
It is this author's opinion that what recent data are revealing
about the Static-99R is not a weakness of the Static in particular. It
is likely to reflect a more general dilemma for any history-based
actuarial risk assessment instrument. No instrument is likely to
function as intended for sex offenders released after 1999.
A core premise of actuarial risk assessment is that more
extensive sexual criminal history in representative offenders in a
group (along with a few other factors) corresponds with higher
rates of offenders becoming detected reoffenders. It was believed
that the criminal histories of offenders permitted them to be sorted
into categories differing significantly in the rates or percentages of
offenders in those categories who would be reconvicted at least one
more time for new sex offenses after release. Different rates mean
different risk. For years this was borne out by research. Samples of
offenders released during the period of the 1950s through the early
1980s showed this pattern (largely the developmental sample for
the original Static). The premise makes intuitive sense. Controlling
for age, a group of sex offenders with more sexual criminal history
is more likely to be composed of offenders with sexual deviance
disorders and dispositions to sexually offend than a group of sex
offenders with less history, the latter being mostly impulsive or
generally aggressive opportunists. More history means a higher
actuarial score. So, higher scores were associated with higher rates.
Rates decades ago were fairly high (compared to now). This
allowed sex offenders to be sorted into meaningfully different
categories according to a statistical interpretation of risk. It also
allowed the highest risk category to be associated with a rate that
seemed directly comparable to a quantitative rendering of the
"likely" criterion for commitment.
It would seem that more recent data, such as those for Florida
sex offenders released since 1999, have undermined this premise.
Released offenders who were recommended for commitment have,
for the most part, extensive histories. But their sexual recidivism
rates are low, virtually as low as rates for offenders without much
history. Why?
It is impossible to know at this point, but speculation is
reasonable. In this author's opinion, the reason, at least in part, is
an interaction between longer sentences and a still underestimated
age effect.
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Criminal sentences have increased in many states over the past
two-and-a-half decades. In Florida, the average time served for
violent offenses (including child molestation and rape) has
increased 137% between 1990 and 2009.28' Decades ago, when
sentences for sexual and violent offenses were shorter, offenders
could have multiple convictions and still be at a relatively young
age at their most recent release. They were still in their sexual
criminal prime, so to speak, even after their third completed
sentence. An argument could be made that this era was also one
where sexual reoffending was easier (less restrictions, etc.). Because
they were more likely to be disordered, offenders with more history
produced fairly high sexual recidivism rates (i.e., high percentages
of offenders becoming reoffenders), and rates substantially higher
than those for offenders with less history, who were more likely to
be impulsive opportunists.
2 9 0
History-based actuarial instruments were never able to
distinguish between offenders with little history (regardless of age)
who were prone to accumulate more history (i.e., reoffend) and
the majority of offenders with little history who were not so
prone. 2 Nor could history-based instruments distinguish between
older offenders with substantial history still prone to offend and
older offenders with the same amount of history who were no
longer prone. But these made up a minority of offenders. Many, if
not most, sex offenders were still in their prime as they approached
release for their most recent conviction (i.e., intact sex drive,
adequate health). Those offenders who were prone to keep
offending were more likely to have more history than those not
prone to keep offending.
As the length of sentences increased, however, offenders
coming out of prison after, for example, a third sex-related
conviction (the commitment-eligible group based on history) came
out considerably older than offenders who came out in previous
years after three convictions, a time when sentences were much
shorter. They had enough history to earn (largely static) paraphilia
289. Data on lengthening sentences since 1990 are discussed in Time Served:
The High Cost, Low Return of Longer Prison Terms, PEw CENTER ON STATES June
6, 2012), www.bridgemi.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PSPPTime-Served
-Report embargoedjtune_62012.pdf.
290. Whether or not actuarial scoring criteria accounted for disorder directly,
the presence of disorder was indicated by history as a proxy.
291. See supra Part II.D.
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diagnoses and high actuarial scores, but they were past their prime.
Offenders coming out who were still in their prime lacked much
history, often having just served their first sentence, which was
lengthy. Groups of offenders with substantial history thus began to
show rates almost as low as those for groups of offenders with less
history, undermining the power of history to discriminate
categories of offenders according to recidivism rates.
This means two things: instruments not yet properly
accounting for age will have higher scoring categories (by virtue of
history) showing much lower recidivism rates and rates not much
different from rates for lower scoring categories. No rate will be
anywhere near 50%. In contrast, instruments properly accounting
for age will now have few offenders getting higher scores at all,
either because they lack history or they are too old. Rates for lower
scores will be low and almost all offenders will fall into low score
categories. Age may be cancelling out history as a risk
discriminator.
One more observation seems relevant. It is about criminal
history and our emotions and value judgments. With its heavy
history basis, actuarial risk at one time appeared to coincide with
just how bad someone's life had been. More criminal history meant
a higher score and also a shockingly worse life. It is this author's
opinion that it has always been difficult for experts (much less non-
experts) to steer that fine line between seeing history as evidence of
current danger, thus warranting commitment, and seeing it as
evidence that someone deserves lifetime confinement
(commitment). But especially when criminal history is far in the
past, even "bad" people may not be currently dangerous. Recent
data are showing this. No doubt history-dominated evaluations will
continue to be done. Juries at least will continue hearing the
message of a "bad guy" deserving commitment. This is the
inherently punitive element of forced hospitalization for criminal
offenders that the Supreme Court did not consider.
If history (as documented in a criminal record) is indeed
becoming unreliable for assessing current risk or danger, such a
state of affairs seriously undermines the ability of mental health
professionals to do assessments of absolute risk with currently
available methodology. The stakes are high, both for missing
predators and possibly confining for life people who are no longer
dangerous and not charged with new crimes. The ethical issues are
grave for any profession devoted to not doing harm to persons
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subject to its practices. The legal and constitutional issues for due
process are also grave.
D. A Lesson for Minnesota: Conditional Release and Treatment Efficacy
for Persons Considered to Be Sexually Violent Predators
Some conclusions are suggested concerning treatment efficacy
for sex offenders subject to SVP proceedings. These claims have
direct relevance for states such as Minnesota considering the
expansion of Less Restrictive Alternative programming, as well as
for states like Florida, which currently lack formal conditional
release options.
Recidivism data for sex offenders recommended for
commitment in Florida but granted conditional release pursuant to
(extra-statutory) settlement agreements offer strong support for
Less Restrictive Alternative programming. Indeed, they suggest that
the majority of offenders who have been found to meet criteria for
civil confinement are manageable on some form of conditional
release. At least in Florida, intensive inpatient treatment in a secure
setting is showing no advantage over outpatient treatment in the
community. Recidivism rates for committed offenders released
after inpatient treatment are about the same as rates for offenders
with settlement agreements requiring participation in outpatient
treatment. The former has cost the state a great deal of money over
the years while the latter has been at the offender's expense. This is
not to say that some state support for outpatient treatment would
not have been desirable. It is just to say that no evidence is showing
that greater cost has produced better results. Finally, no evidence
indicates that completion of inpatient treatment in a secure civil
facility has any risk-reductive advantage over treatment
participation.
This does not mean that inpatient sex offender treatment
programming is poorly designed or administered. With rates as low
as they are, even for untreated offenders, it is unlikely that any
intervention can significantly lower rates any further. This may
reflect a kind of statistical floor effect. Any group of released sex
offenders will have some percentage of offenders going on to
offend again. It is not realistic to expect any treatment program to
produce a zero recidivism rate.
The data support an even stronger conclusion, albeit one that
bears further study. Data so far provide little if any evidence of a
treatment effect at all for offenders considered by mental health
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experts to be sexually violent predators, whether inpatient or
outpatient. Detainees granted full discharges with no expected
treatment have sexual recidivism rates about as low as offenders
with settlement agreements and formerly committed offenders.
Rates were slightly lower for the last group, but they possess
features unrelated to treatment that would account for their lower
rate (e.g., significantly less time in the community and older age at
release).
These claims do not imply that sex offender treatment
programming, whether inpatient or outpatient, is poorly designed
or administered. If that were true then it would be reasonable to
expect a differently designed or administered program to produce
rates significantly below rates that are already low. But this is not
realistic. Again, there is a statistical floor effect. Any group of
released sex offenders will have some percentage of offenders
going on to offend again. No treatment program will produce a
zero recidivism rate.
E. The Effect of Commitment on Crime Rates: Is It Worth the Money ?
This leads us to the issue of whether SVP commitment
programs are the best way to accomplish the legitimate public
policy goal of protecting the community from sexual crime. Given
the problems with risk assessment, should the state have a crime
prevention program so heavily reliant on mental health
professionals attempting to gauge absolute risk in individual cases?
Was commitment a good way to expend crime prevention
resources?
Even if policymakers tolerate numerous unnecessary
commitments for every necessary one (until the constitutional
challenge sure to come), a preliminary analysis of commitment in
Florida gives no support for the belief that sex offender-specific
commitment has been cost effective. There has been no
measurable impact on statewide sexual crime rates. Rates were
already declining prior to commitment, at an even greater rate of
decline.
Commitment probably has achieved the indefinite
confinement for most of the very dangerous sex offenders who
were referred for commitment consideration. Their potential
victims were spared. This is an extremely good thing, wherever one
stands with respect to commitment laws.
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However, from a policy perspective, the issue is whether the
money spent on preventing sexual crime through civil confinement
has produced better results than if the same or less money had
been spent on other measures. It is at least conceivable that the
same money could be spent strengthening already existing criminal
justice structures such as sex offender-specific probation and
prison-based treatment programming. Criminal justice structures
(e.g., sex offender-specific probation) affect vastly more sex
offenders than commitment, at much lower cost per offender. Risk
assessment in a criminal justice context could have been limited to
broad group-wise sorting of offenders into rank ordered categories
(relative risk), permitting focused targeting of community-based
resources on groups otherwise expected to have higher recidivism
rates. As discussed, at least in Florida, the most widely used
actuarial instruments (Static) are not unproblematic even for
relative risk. But attempts to sort offenders by groups into different
levels of community-based structures are far less problematic than
making individualized opinions about absolute risk that potentially
lead to many unnecessary and potentially lifetime confinements.
There is no way to know with any certainty how many sexual
crimes would have been prevented had the money spent on
commitment (or some of that money) been spent in an alternative
manner while still targeted on sex offenders. Perhaps few would
have been prevented, given how low rates are even without much
intervention. Throwing money at what was already becoming a bad-
outcome floor effect may have had little measurable impact. What
can be said is that the number of offenses prevented by
commitment is fewer than what lawmakers probably expected. No
basis whatsoever exists for thinking that commitment has prevented
"thousands" of sexual crimes. Given how low this number probably
is, no evidence to date suggests that commitment has prevented
more sexual offenses than what would have been possible with
different policies. It may have prevented fewer.
Summary claims are preliminary, but empirically supported at
this point. No empirical or scientific basis exists for the opinion
that the Florida SVP Act has been efficacious. Whatever its
popularity, involuntary hospitalization continues to be the most
expensive way to manage sex offenders, and with little discernible
advantage.
[Vol. 41:3
85
Montaldi: A Study of the Efficacy of the Sexually Violent Predator Act in F
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
2015] EFFICACY OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT 865
F. Ethical Concerns
A summary claim is also possible concerning the kind of
efficacy that is relevant to due process and the professional ethics
of mental health experts. There is now an empirical basis for the
opinion that commitment eligibility determinations based on
longstanding risk assessment and clinical evaluation practices
generate a high number of unnecessary commitments, exceeding
the number of necessary commitments many times over. For
mental health professionals, the data are sending a clear message.
Current risk assessment and clinical evaluation practices applied to
commitment eligibility determinations may have helped spare
some people-who would not have been saved by a commitment-
alternative approach-the great harm of sexual violence. But they
have also helped facilitate great harm done to the lives and liberty
of many persons who were no longer dangerous. Many will say that
if assessments had been based on clinical judgment alone, without
the acknowledgment of research (i.e., without actuarial methods),
they would have harmed even more people no longer dangerous.
That may be true. But harm was done nonetheless, and in more
than rare instances. Experts did not have this knowledge at the
time they were doing commitment evaluations and making final
determinations about recommendation for commitment. Now they
do.
APPENDIX
Data on all offenders referred to SVPP for commitment
consideration (up to the summer of 2013) are discussed in a report
by the Florida Sun Sentinel. 29 2 The report alleged that the
commitment process (and perhaps sex offender laws in general) is
"broken" in Florida because "hundreds" of rapists and other sex
offenders who went on to have new offenses were released instead
of committed. The report used conviction/charge data from the
Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
In the main body of the story, the authors do not discuss the
total sample size from which their reconviction and new charge
data come. Nor do they discuss the significance of rates in
understanding the significance of recidivism data; they just give raw
total numbers of offenders with new charges and convictions and
292. Kestin & Williams, supra note 2.
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describe these as too many. No analysis was given to the issue of
whether these individuals had sufficient sexual criminal history to
warrant high actuarial scores and paraphilia diagnoses (eligibility
criteria).
Sample size is discussed briefly in a section readers can access
through a link on the web version of the story. In this section the
authors describe how they conducted their study. There it is stated
that the sample was around 31,000 offenders. However, the authors
minimize the significance of such a large sample size to what
percentage of the sample consists of the reoffenders. They imply
that the true size of the sample, for purposes of thinking about
meaningful percentages, is much smaller.
First, the authors report that 10,000 of the 31,000 offenders in
the sample were returned to prison and therefore had limited
opportunity to sexually reoffend after release (after the period of
incarceration during which they were considered for
commitment). They say that 1800 of these offenders were never
released. Second, the authors report that 4800 offenders from the
sample had died, were deported, or moved to another state. Finally,
they report that 5500 offenders have unknown addresses or
locations; 130 are fugitives. A total of 7600 were known to be living
in Florida.
These facts have less relevance than the authors suppose.
It may be that 10,000 offenders were returned to prison at
some point after being released from the period of incarceration
during which they were considered for commitment. It is also true
that their time in the community is therefore "limited." But so is
the time of any released offender who will die eventually. The issue
is whether any empirical or logical basis exists for assuming that
release time for these offenders is so sharply limited that they should
not be included in a sample used to study recidivism. Obviously, if
an offender is released and then rearrested that same day for a
non-sexual offense that returns him to prison for life, he has not
had enough time in the community to meaningfully examine his
recidivism potential (or for it to impact that of a sample). He has
not had a meaningful opportunity to reoffend. The same is not
true of the offender who returns to prison five years after release.
But the authors cite no data on how long these offenders were
in prison or how much time they spent in the community before
returning to prison. The average release time of the sample is not
known but is likely to be six to seven years at least. Some have been
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released fourteen years and others less than a year. Many were
released from the incarceration during which they were considered
for commitment for as long as ten years. In Florida, an offender on
probation can be returned to prison for a period of months for a
probation violation. SVPP found that 466 out of 710 offenders
(66%) recommended for commitment had not returned to prison
for even as brief a period as a month and a day. Jail time is
unknown but is usually less than a year. Offenders not
recommended are likely to be similar, if even less prone to go back
to prison (given their typically less extensive criminal histories).
Offenders spending limited periods in prison, or spending years in
the community before returning to prison, should remain in the
sample. At this point, no good reason exists for excluding any
significant percentage of the 10,000 from the sample.
The authors state that 1800 offenders were never released but
they are not clear about what this means. Does this mean they were
never released (again) after returning to prison? Then the question
is, how many years did they spend in the community before going
back to prison? Or, do the authors mean that these offenders were
not released from the period of prison incarceration during which
they were considered for commitment? If the former is true, then if
someone was in the community several years before returning to
prison he should not be excluded from the sample. Whether or not
he is ever released again is irrelevant.
What about the 4800 offenders who died, were deported, or
moved to another state? The authors cite no data indicating how
long offenders were in the community prior to death, deportation,
or moving to another state. Obviously, someone who dies after
several years in the community should not be excluded in the
sample. The same is true for persons deported or who moved to
another state. For offenders recommended for commitment, SVPP
examined Department of Corrections websites in other states when
at least an out-of-state address was listed for the offender's intended
residence prior to release. No additional reoffenders were found. It
is not yet known but it seems likely, based on what was found for
recommended offenders, that the percentage of non-
recommended offenders who reoffended only in another state or
country is small. Without these details, no good reason exists for
excluding any sizable percentage of the 4800 from the sample.
Then there are the 5500 offenders whose whereabouts are not
known (including the 130 fugitives). No reason exists to use
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unknown address as a reason for excluding these offenders from
the sample. Unknown residence for an offender does not mean
that a new offense by that offender would not bring a charge or
conviction that would allow him to be detected in a recidivism
study. Indeed, both his location and his recidivism status would
now be known. The same is true for fugitives.
Suppose we err on the extreme conservative side. If we exclude
from a sample of 31,000 offenders the 10,000 returning to prison
(which includes the 1800 never released), the 4800 who died or
were deported or moved out of state, and the 5500 offenders with
unknown whereabouts (which would include the 130 fugitives), this
would leave a sample of 10,700 offenders. Given the sex-related
reconviction and new charge data cited by the authors, the
reconviction rate would then be 5.6% (594 / 10, 700 x 100) and the
new charge rate would be 12.9% (1384/ 10,700 x 100).
The latter rate is remarkably close to the new charge rate
found in the Adam Walsh study for a sample of randomly selected,
typical sex offenders in Florida released from prison (which means
they were not recommended for commitment). The Adam Walsh
291rate was 13.7% for Florida sex offenders released ten years.
Finally, this rate is little different from the ten-year rate for a
random sample of Minnesota sex offenders (12.9%). Minnesota
has one of the nation's most draconian commitment laws.294
In sum, even if all the authors' assumptions are granted and
the sample of offenders not recommended for commitment is
greatly reduced in size, the resulting sexual recidivism rate is still
typical for average sex offenders in Florida and other states. Civil
commitment criteria were intended to apply to sex offenders who
are not average. No evidence indicates that Florida's SVPP failed to
recommend for commitment a significant number of sex offenders
whose case files contained sufficient evidence that they met criteria
at the time of review.
293. ZGOBA ETAL., supra note 7, at 20-21.
294. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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